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Personal Identification (PIN) Safe Model to Analyze  
Unsafe Actions that Characterize Maritime Accidents 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 This research focuses attention on safety challenges in maritime accidents, as 
the basis of conditions of unsafe actions of the human factor. Analyzing data is based on 
reports from JTSB (Japan Transport Safety Board) during 1991-2008.  
 All equipment and systems has sensitive operations in working environment. 
While interacting of human in working performance have limitations in human element. 
In the strategy of Personal Identification (PIN) Safe model within working environment 
considering two condition about substandard practices of operators and substandard 
working conditions of operators. Substandard conditions are broken down from 
attribution of causes interacting with adverse mental states, adverse physiological states, 
and physical/mental limitations. Types of substandard practices include crew resource 
mismanagement and personal readiness. Each of these subcategories is discussed in the 
model of the characteristic of the human element in analyzing data. In the theory of 
causation in the maritime field is mentioned that one of the root cause analysis problems 
considered using 4 M (Man, Machine, Media, Management) Factors. Every factor while 
interacting where the center is a human who has the limitation in 
decision-making/taking actions will result in unsafe conditions or unsafe actions. While 
generating have a significant error from standard performance, can be said to be human 
error. Any unsafe actions or conditions lead to incident or accident has risks. 
 Reliability of safety critical system is implemented in risks for human beings in 
its environment, such as unsafe actions in maritime accident. Critical systems 
engineering is to avoid disasters. A critical system is any system whose 'failure' could 
threaten human life, the system's environment of the organization which operates the 
systems. These people may interact with system or not. In safety critical system, people 
need to be aware of these risks and know what to do in the case of problems. Any 
reasonable conclusion possible as Personal Identification (PIN) Safe model is done in 
logic of pattern in working environment. 
 In this research (as shown in fig.1.3) Logic of patterns (AND/OR), as 
developed by the author, is used to illustrate how a combination of both can occur. In 
the logic of the patterns, the author has conducted research how to implement logic such 
as AND / OR to determine the exposure of sensitive situation using taxonomy error 
codes which is implemented in a union set. It is integrated into a model called a 
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Personal Identification (PIN) Safe model. Based on this reasoning, Personal 
Identification (PIN) Safe model is done in logic of patterns of human beings. 
The result of this research is: 
a. Identifying human elements in risk. 
 Identifying human elements is based on unsafe actions and their root cause to 
determine any kind of risk in maritime accidents. Any unsafe actions have different 
characteristics that lead to kinds of maritime accidents. The assessment step is applied 
in probability weight as a measure to determine the level of risk associated with a 
specific hazard. The result indicates the level of consequences from a risk. Minimizing 
the decrease of quality human performance as impacted in unsafe actions is 
implemented with 3A (awareness, action and attitude) behavior in part of PIN Safe 
model. 
b. Improving quality of decisions in response to unsafe actions 
 Quality of decisions is increasing quality sense of decisions by input, process 
and output to get situational awareness and situational familiarity in working 
environment to minimize any significant deviations, particularly in the maritime 
transport system. These elements are embedded in very complex, interdependent, and 
dynamic relationships. The maritime transport system is a very complex and large-scale 
socio-technical environment system consisting of human actions that interact with each 
other and operate in a physical environment in the term man-machine-media and 
management. Knowledge of working environment is one part of decreasing the risk 
value of an individual ship. Every risk will reach to accident. Considering further that it 
has the probability accident which is determined by the ship’s time and location. 
Effective analysis and practice is the counter measure for reducing the human elements’ 
involvement by studying the patterns that have the same value as of probability weight 
in taxonomy error. These have been developed in order to get the performance shaping 
factors by PIN Safe model as anticipation of engineering controls. 
c. Controlling the patterns of unsafe action in risk  
 Risk is the probability and severity of loss from exposure to the hazard. The 
accident probability for an individual ship is determined using so called “exposures” 
and a casualty rate. The exposures are the number of potential casualty sensitive 
situations in which the ship can be involved that could lead to an accident. This process 
definition will be easier to recognize by the taxonomy error in the performance of the 
seafarer.  
 The probability weight and severity of accident that could result produce a 
pattern from the hazard, based upon the exposures of personal unsafe actions within the 
iii 
 
hazard. From such pattern there can be shown how navigation problems contribute as 
the highest input to the collision accident. It is expected that the exposures are a key to 
developing human performance. During operations of workers, it can be seen how they 
will be affected by a given event or, over time, by repeated events.  
d. Monitoring the patterns of unsafe action 
 Repeated events as unsafe actions need evaluation. Regarding these situations, 
the author has been researching methods in the control of taxonomy error of unsafe 
actions till within 4M factors as a comprehensive monitoring information process in 
PIN Safe model. These are needed for the role of management to evaluate. Strong 
management to analyze events’ characteristics of unsafe actions is important in 
establishing the evaluation strategies. Monitoring all factors should be done to avoid 
critical situations and to minimize human casualty. In chapter 5, there is a result that 
highest cases of human casualty come from unsafe actions such as improper 
management for ship operation, management of electrical equipment, improper 
handling and other tasks, improper fishing work, poor management of passengers and 
cargo loading; and others. There is the need for keeping continuous and specific training 
in a limited time. Knowing the kind of monitoring in unsafe actions can help to map 
features of human limitations to get a unique approach to improving human 
performance. 
 
The summary dissertation has structures consisting of: 
 In chapter 1, the background comprising the reasons for the research issues is 
explained.  
 In chapter 2, the terms of safety in maritime systems are explained, such as the 
safety responsibilities within the industry at the international, regional, flag state 
regulations, and port state control levels. The emphasis is placed on the International 
Safety Management (ISM) Code, which provides the minimum standards and guidelines 
for operational safety management in the maritime system. The maritime system is 
interconnected by 4M (Man, Machine, Media and Management) factors which cover the 
four pillars of basic safety in critical situations. Clearly, the human elements are 
identified in the maritime system as people abilities and limitations, and the influences 
of man, machine media, and management by IMO and Anita Rothblum. Taking into 
account the characteristic of maritime accidents, the human elements are explored in 
this dissertation with the main focus being on the unsafe actions of seafarers, and their 
underlying contributors such as the operators’ personality that have a deep influence on 
the operator’s performance. The external elements that are included are the environment, 
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the society and ship itself, as these have a direct influence on operators and are deemed 
to be aspects of the human element.  
 In chapter 3, the theories of accident causation being prevented by identifying 
the root causes of maritime accidents are described. These stem from known accident 
investigation techniques and the methods are based on the management model 
(Henrich’s Model) and on behavior models (human error, human factors, human 
elements).Collaboration activities are directed to control the unsafe personal 
performance of certain knowledge, attitudes and abilities. The chapter describes the 
accident causation theories. The importance of understanding the accident causation 
theories is recognized by how unsafe actions in the construction workplaces cause 
losses through safety response – the similarity is used as a model for the maritime 
system. 
 In chapter 4, the creation of the integration of an unsafe action in the design of 
safety critical systems, by the new method called Personal Identification (PIN) Safe 
model, is used. Strong management to identify every characteristic of unsafe actions is 
reached to establish the evaluation strategies. PIN Safe model is a counter measure to 
devise a systematic identification of substandard, unsafe actions and critical events 
associated with characteristic accidents on a ship. PIN Safe model is shown in 
anticipation of engineering controls. Its model includes anticipation of all human factors. 
Initiating events as unsafe actions will lead to process deviations. Measurement 
parameters in all operations by approaching logic of patterns can help to suggest for 
improved motivation of the self; and censoring of equipment by ergonomic design is 
useful to help to reach good performance in the working environment. 
 In chapter 5, the identification of unsafe actions in risk recognizes unsafe 
action as being one of the features of the human element. There are many unsafe actions 
that lead to failures, such as improper look-out, fatigue, no indication of navigation 
lights and shapes, signaling failures, improper ship's speed, ignoring the COLREGS, 
main engine failure, etc. The initial investigation is begun to study unsafe actions (as 
seen in fig 1.1 and 1.2) to know the risk of every unsafe action. Any unsafe actions have 
different characteristics which can lead to maritime accidents and their consequences.  
 In chapter 6, the human performance behavior of the seafarer’s decision- 
making is analyzed. Using logic of patterns in probability weight value, interactions of 
unsafe actions by taxonomy of error modes are analyzed. Such actions include, but are 
not limited to, control failure, omission or repetition, reversal, too fast, too slow, too 
early, too little, too much, wrong input and miss-calibration associated with various 
scenarios within the precepts of 4M (Man, Machine, Media and Management) factors. 
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The author shows that human elements have caused the probability of accident, and 
shown are the patterns of unsafe actions in maritime accidents. 
 In chapter 7, the consideration and conclusion are implemented to show the 
results of research in all previous chapters. The results conclude that the human 
elements that contribute to unsafe actions when interacting with equipment and other 
systems, illustrate the fact that anyone has limitations, anyone has different 
characteristics of unsafe actions. And that strong management is needed, as is 
monitoring and controlling of operations in a breakdown. Safety culture in all parties. 
The evaluation assessment will be reached to improve safety culture at sea.  
Further research is also shown.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 “Almost 90 percent of world trade is transported by sea, in ships. On ships are 
carried food, fuel, raw materials, commodities and goods on which we all depend. 
Seaborne trade facilitates the global economy and it is no exaggeration to say that 
almost everything we touch has, at some point in its existence, been transported by sea 
or derived from something that was transported by sea. Today we acknowledge the 
seafarers who operate the ships, bringing cargo safely to its destination, keeping to the 
schedules, day in and day out, regardless of the conditions they may have to face. 
Without seafarers, our lives cannot be sustained. Yet, to most of us, seafarers are 
virtually invisible”. When opening the Year of the Seafarer in 2012, the above declared 
by Koji Sekimizu, Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
[1]. 
 The number of seafarers around the world serving in international trade is 
estimated to be approximately 1.5 million people. The community of the seafarer is able 
to raise world awareness of the vital role that seafarers play in the global economy and 
bring to the fore their role in safety and efficiency; both with minimal impact on the 
environment. 
 Improving the performance of seafarers is to be one of the most important tasks 
of safety at sea. Maritime accidents have increased with the number of ships. They are 
known to be caused by human, environmental, and technical factors. Human errors are 
inseparable from the human element that influences the mariner’s decisions and actions. 
The number of qualified sailors has not kept pace with the increasing number of ships. 
A look at maritime casualties reveals that 96% of all accidents can be attributed to the 
human element [2],[3],[4] wherein a study concluded that 60% of all accidents are 
directly caused by human errors, whereas a further 30% of accidents are indirectly 
caused by human error. Thus, the human elements has a strong impact on maritime 
accidents. Therefore, improving the living conditions on ship and ensuring the 
competence in qualifications of the crew are important factors for seagoing individuals. 
 
1.2 General Goal 
 This research is conducted in light of the safety challenges to merchant 
shipping. The fact that the human element is involved in maritime casualties, including 
collisions, has attracted concern from all parties in the maritime industry. The 
researchers from various countries especially from Europe and the USA have done a 
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great deal of work.  
 In order to see the extent of the problem, various human element classifications 
used in different accident reports and databases will be reviewed. The Japan Marine 
Accident Inquiry Agency (JMAIA) merged with the ARAIC (Air and Rail) from 
October 2008 and together are now known as the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB). 
Thus the JTSB is the Japanese government agency that investigates accidents on ships 
and marine equipment. The JTSB (Japan Transport Safety Board) and its data reports 
[5] are classified under two main headings: kinds of accident and causes of accidents at 
sea. 
 
Fig.1.1 Report of maritime accident in 1998-2008, Japan 
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Fig. 1.2 Report of unsafe action in maritime accident, in 1998-2008,Japan 
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 Fig.1.1 describes the types of accidents that happen every day, such as collision, 
stranding/ grounding, sinking, capsizing, distress, fire, explosion, engine failure, 
missing, equipment damage, facilities damage, casualty, safety inhibitor, operation 
inhibitor, flooding. From the data found that 3 (three) categories were involved in the 
majority of maritime accidents: collision was involved in 64.10 %, stranding is 13.93 % 
and engine failure is 2.0 %. Fig.1.2 indicates causes of maritime accidents. Causes of 
maritime accident are events brought about by unsafe actions of the human element, 
such as improper management for ship operation, poor repair condition on ship structure, 
poor preparation for sea, improper hydrographic survey, poor course selection, improper 
ship handling, unconfirmed ship's position, etc. More detailed explanations will be 
explained in chapter 5. 
 The current research is conducted in light of the safety challenges in merchant 
shipping. During the previous 18-years period 1991-2008, it was estimated that more 
23,515 cases of marine accidents occured (Appendix-A).  
 One way to minimize accidents at sea is to better developed human elements’ 
performance within the very complex and large-scale in Socio-Technical Environment 
(STE) of maritime systems. The system comprises human and man-made entities that 
interactwith each other and which operate in a physical environment. The main 
elements of the system are objects of transport, infrastructures and facilities, which are 
linked by 4 M (man, machine, media, and management) factors in their activities. 
 
1.3 Methodology  
 The method used in this dissertation consists of the following steps:  
1. Constructing a classification for collecting and storing the data of human elements 
involved in human casualty and collision accidents.  
2. Gathering data of human elements involved from various sources especially from 
current written accident reports.  
3. Collecting experiences with and guidance for retrospective unsafe actions cases and 
making model standards for safety. 
4. Describing of the industrial use for improved human performance by using taxonomy 
errors in unsafe actions in maritime accidents. 
 
1.4 Dissertation Structure  
 In chapter 1, the background comprising the reasons for the research issues is 
explained.  
 In chapter 2, the terms of safety in maritime systems are explained, such as the 
safety responsibilities within the industry at the international, regional, flag state 
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regulations, and port state control levels. The emphasis is placed on the International 
Safety Management (ISM) Code, which provides the minimum standards and guidelines 
for operational safety management in the maritime system. The maritime system is 
interconnected by 4M (Man, Machine, Media and Management) factors which cover the 
four pillars of basic safety in critical situations. Clearly, the human elements are 
identified in the maritime system as people abilities and limitations, and the influences 
of man, machine media, and management by IMO and Anita Rothblum. Taking into 
account the characteristic of maritime accidents, the human elements are explored in 
this dissertation with the main focus being on the unsafe actions  of seafarers, and their 
underlying contributors such as the operators’ personality that have a deep influence on 
the operator’s performance. The external elements that are included are the environment, 
the society and ship itself, as these have a direct influence on operators and are deemed 
to be aspects of the human element.  
 In chapter 3, the theories of accident causation being prevented by identifying 
the root causes of maritime accidents are described. These stem from known accident 
investigation techniques and the methods are based on the management model 
(Henrich’s Model) and on behavior models (human error, human factors, human 
elements).Collaboration activities are directed to control the unsafe personal 
performance of certain knowledge, attitudes and abilities. The chapter describes the 
accident causation theories. The importance of understanding the accident causation 
theories is recognized by how unsafe actions in the construction workplaces cause 
losses through safety response – the similarity is used as a model for the maritime 
system. 
 In chapter 4, the creation of the integration of an unsafe action in the design of 
safety critical systems, by the new method called Personal Identification (PIN) Safe 
model, is used. Strong management to identify every characteristic of unsafe actions is 
reached to establish the evaluation strategies. PIN Safe model is a counter measure to 
devise a systematic identification of substandard, unsafe actions and critical events 
associated with characteristic accidents on a ship. PIN Safe model is shown in 
anticipation of engineering controls. Its model includes anticipation of all human factors. 
Initiating events as unsafe actions will lead to process deviations. Measurement 
parameters in all operations by approaching logic of patterns can help to suggest for 
improved motivation of the self; and censoring of equipment by ergonomic design is 
useful to help to reach good performance in the working environment. 
 In chapter 5, the identification of unsafe actions in risk recognizes unsafe 
action as being one of the features of the human element. There are many unsafe actions 
that lead to failures, such as improper look-out, fatigue, no indication of navigation 
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lights and shapes, signaling failures, improper ship's speed, ignoring the COLREGS, 
main engine failure, etc. The initial investigation is begun to study unsafe actions (as 
seen in fig 1.1 and 1.2) to know the risk of every unsafe action. Any unsafe actions have 
different characteristics which can lead to maritime accidents and their consequences.  
 In chapter 6, the human performance behavior of the seafarer’s decision- 
making is analyzed. Using logic of patterns in probability weight value, interactions of 
unsafe actions by taxonomy of error modes are analyzed. Such actions include, but are 
not limited to, control failure, omission or repetition, reversal, too fast, too slow, too 
early, too little, too much, wrong input and miss-calibration associated with various 
scenarios within the precepts of 4M (Man, Machine, Media and Management) factors. 
The author shows that human elements have caused the probability of accident, and 
shown are the patterns of unsafe actions in maritime accidents. 
 In chapter 7, the consideration and conclusion are implemented to show the 
results of research in all previous chapters. The results conclude that the human 
elements that contribute to unsafe actions when interacting with equipment and other 
systems, illustrate the fact that anyone has limitations, anyone has different 
characteristics of unsafe actions. And that strong management is needed, as is 
monitoring and controlling of operations in a breakdown. Safety culture in all parties. 
The evaluation assessment will be reached to improve safety culture at sea.  
Further research is also shown.  
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CHAPTER 2 
TERM OF SAFETY IN MARITIME SYSTEM 
 
 Unless safety is the dominated characteristic of an organization's culture, there 
will be no collecting of documentation of unsafe actions from an event caused by 
human factors. The statement of safe actions of the term is the “developed stage of a 
technical capability at a given time as regards products, processes and services, based 
on relevant consolidated findings of science, technology and experience” by the 
International Organization for Standardization is ISO (International Standard 
Organization) and the International Electro technical Commission (IEC) in reference 
number ISO/IEC 90003:2004.  
 This chapter is describing an overview of the statement of safety through 
regulations. Types of safety regulations are included in any overview of relationships in 
a maritime system. An overview within the responsibilities of 4M factors in safety 
culture. Reducing violations of rules is needed as a requirement of a ship to support a 
good safety culture. Safety culture will be developed if maximum safe actions are 
implemented to reduce failures in the organizational maritime system. 
 
2.1 The Concept of Safety  
 In the literature reviews Adreas [6] has mentioned about: 
The term safety is derived from the Latin ‘salvus, meaning ‘safe’. In existing literature, 
there are several definitions of safety. Leveson [7] argued that if we deal with security 
and reliability in absolute terms and that could envision safety as a continuum, where 
one end is freedom from loss and with the continuum stretching towards increasing loss. 
“Safety is freedom from accidents or losses”. Redmill et al. [8] refers to safety as a state, 
and that a safe state is a state where the perceived risk is acceptably low (and may 
include unperceived risk). They also argue that “perfect safety is impossible to achieve 
and, even if it were achieved, it would be impossible to prove that it had been achieved”. 
Even though there are many definitions of safety, they all have in common the aspects 
of being free from something undesired, unwanted or unacceptable.  
 A standard definition of safety is defined by ISO and IEC is “freedom from 
unacceptable risk” in ISO/IEC Guide 51, 1999 [9].  
 
2.2 Perspective of Safety in the Maritime System 
 The culture of safety and casualty in maritime system is defined as concern 
about unsafe actions given which lead to incident or accident causation by human 
elements.  
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Why is “human elements” chosen? 
Because humans are not simply an element like others such as machine, media, and 
management. They are the center of the shipping company. They are the secret of its 
successes and the victims of its failures. It is human nature that drives what happens 
every day at work from the routine tasks of a ship’s rating, right through to the policy 
decisions of the IMO [10]. 
IMO (1997a) interpreted the meaning of the term “human elements” as “a complex 
multidimensional issue that affects maritime safety and marine environmental 
protection”; it involves the entire spectrum of human activities performed by ship’s crew, 
shore-based management, regulatory bodies, recognized organizations, shipyards, 
legislators, and other relevant parties [11]. 
In the context of safety, the term of human factor has been defined by the UK Health 
and Safety Executive as follows [12]:  
The perceptual, mental, physical capabilities of people and interaction of individual 
with job and working environments, the influence of equipment and system design on 
human performance and above all, the organizational characteristics which influence 
safety related behavior at work. 
 Kuo [13], however mentioned in the context of safety that is not always 
possible because safety is not absolute, but it is governed by personal perception. As 
technology advances and new ship concepts are developed, the limitation of the 
approach to regulatory perspective becomes noticeable. 
 
2.3 Safety Regulations in Maritime Field 
 Safety Regulations are rules issued by the government to manage the risk of 
harm that could occur and to minimize the effects of hazards to the public. Transport, 
which can be considered as a "mobile" danger, has been at the fore front of regulatory 
control. 
 In shipping, the (UK) government implemented early intervention for 
certification of masters and deck officers and later, when steam was introduced such 
intervention was applied to marine engineer officers. The foundering of so many ships 
at sea and resultant loss of life and cargo in the nineteenth century led to the 
introduction of the Load Line to ensure adequate buoyancy and freeboard. The loss of 
Titanic led to The International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) which 
required all passengers’ and crew on a ship to have to adequate lifesaving equipment. In 
order to gain proper understanding of safety management within shipping, knowledge 
of the most important laws and the international regulative framework is necessary. 
 As pointed out from literature reviews Kuo [13] fig. 2.1.gives the overview of 
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the International Regulatory System, Maritime Administration, and conventions related 
to safety management, and they are shown as support to safety culture. 
IMO Regulations
(International Maritime Organization)
MARPOL 
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Regional 
Regulations
Regional 
Regulations
Regional 
Regulations
Regional 
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Flag state
Flag state
Flag state
Flag state
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PS 
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PS 
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PS 
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PS 
Regulat
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PS 
Regulat
ions 
ISM Code 
Regulations
 
Fig.2.1 Types of safety regulations 
 There are many safety rules with varying levels of interest and application. 
Thus it helps to group or classify them in some way, so as to assist in gaining an 
understanding of their roles and applications such as IMO (International Maritime 
Organizations) Regulations, local rules, Flag state and Port State (PS) regulations. This 
classification involves the details in section below: 
 
2.3.1 International Regulations 
 Regulations in this group have international implications that they affect ships 
which operate in international waters. They come from the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) through conventions, protocols and resolutions which are then 
processed through various committees. First, in 1948 an international conference held in 
Geneva, Switzerland adopted a convention to formally establish the Inter-Governmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), but it did not come into force until 1958. 
IMCO was changed to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1982. It now 
has its permanent building in London and had a membership of 170 member states s and 
three Associate Members are entitled to attend, as are the intergovernmental 
organizations with which agreements of cooperation have been concluded, and 
non-governmental organizations in consultative status with IMO [14]. There are many 
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international regulations relating to maritime safety, as highlighted the below: 
 
2.3.1.1 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention 
 Safety of life at sea has always been most important issue ever since ships were 
used to carry passengers and cargoes, but it was only after the sinking of the passenger 
ship Titanic that formalization began. The Titanic sank on 12 April 1912 with the loss 
of 817 passengers and 673 crews on her maiden voyage from Southampton to New 
York. This led to calls for unifying separate safety agreement to ship safety e.g. mutual 
recognition of certificates and survey and more coordinated approach to the safety life 
at sea. Fig. 2.2. details the conference of SOLAS.  
 
Fig.2.2 History of SOLAS 
 This led to the revised SOLAS 1960 and further conferences took place in 1974, 
1990 and 1995 with significant amendments made regularly. The latest version of 
1913 
•was attended by 16 countries. 
• the meeting lasted ten weeks.  
1914 
•but never came into force because of out the break of the First 
World War. 
 
1915 
• was attended by 18 countries. 
• the meeting lasted seven weeks.  
• this conference contained proposed rules and principles for 
international observance under the following headings: 
Construction of passengers ships, live-saving appliances, radio-
telegraphy (communication), navigation, safety certificates. 
1948 
•with representatives from 30 countries.  
• the main purpose was to review the SOLAS 1929 convention in 
the light of experience gained and Scientifics advances made 
over the intervening years.  
1960 
•with representatives from 55 countries. 
• the issue that prompted the conference were development of 
the inflatable life raft and the introduction of ships using 
nuclear power plants. 
• in addition, the increased frequency of ships collisions raised 
concern because this feature was not included in the previous 
SOLAS conventions.  
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SOLAS regulations are given in IMO [15]. 
 
2.3.1.2 Prevention and Control of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Convention 
 Growth in demand for oil as the primary energy source is the second half of the 
20
th
 century led to the development of increasing size and cargo capacity. These 
VLCC’s (Very Large Crude Carrier) transported oil to and from both on-shore and 
off-shore refineries. This increase in maritime traffic introduced a new problem, which 
of Marine Pollution from oil. There are effects of activities of shipping that influence 
marine pollution it can occur in several ways with the most significant being runoffs 
from land into rivers and adjacent seas; collisions between ships, grounding, 
discharging of oil, and disposal of engine room wastes into the sea.  
 The regulations are made to cover accidental and operational oil pollution of 
the sea caused by chemicals, goods in package form, sewage, and garbage. There are 
also the problems of air pollution and that is dealt with under new regulations. IMO was 
given the task to design and build a system to provide compensation to those who had 
suffered financially as a result of pollution. For details see the IMO regulations [16]. 
 
2.3.1.3 STCW Conventions 
 Kuo [17]. The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watch keeping for Seafarers (STCW) was first held in 1978 and was the first to set 
minimum standards for training and certification of ship officers. 
 In 1995 amendments were done to the convention in 1978 and two-part STCW 
code was produced. 
Part A of the code is mandatory. The minimum standards of competence required for 
seagoing personnel are given in detail in a series of tables. Chapter II of the code, for 
example deals with standards regarding the master and deck department.  
Part B of the Code contains recommended guidance which is intended to help parties 
implement the convention. 
 There are two aspects of STCW 95 that are worth a brief comment. Firstly 
chapter I dealt with a number of common issues that have significant implications. For 
example, the concept of Port State Control, where the port could hold the vessel for 
deficiencies in meeting code regulations such as certificates, not in the order. Others 
include the use of simulators for crew training, fatigue and prevention personnel as a 
precaution. Secondly, not all countries were willing to be party to the convention, and a 
special feature required the contents of the convention to be obeyed by ships of 
non-parties countries while visiting ports of countries who are parties. A major change 
was the authority given to verify the training providers in all countries where such 
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facilities exist. The STCW Convention is currently being revised again at the time of 
writing. 
 
2.3.1.4 The International Safety Management (ISM) Code  
 Oltedal [18]. The ISM Code became mandatory for all merchant vessels above 
500 gross tons in two waves, depending upon type of vessel, namely, July 1, 1998, and 
July 1, 2002. Until the adoption of the ISM Code, IMO had attempted to improve 
shipping safety largely by improving the hardware of shipping (e.g., the construction of 
ships and their equipment). By comparison, the ISM Code focuses on the way shipping 
companies are managed. The ISM Code is the first to provide regulations and guidelines 
to promote the development of sound management and operating practices in order to 
ensure crew safety and avoid damage to the environment. The shipping industry is 
known to have a reactive approach toward safety as the process of regulating the 
activity has evolved primarily as a response to maritime disasters. Development of the 
ISM Code was also based upon a growing recognition that loss of life at sea and 
environmental pollution are influenced by the way in which companies manage their 
fleets. 
 The ISM Code requires shipping companies to develop, implement, and  
maintain a safety management system, which includes the following  functional 
requirements: (1) a safety policy; (2) instructions and procedures to ensure safe 
operations of ships in compliance with relevant international and flag state legislation; 
(3) defined levels of authority and lines of communication between and amongst shore 
and shipboard personnel; (4) procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities 
with the provision of the ISM Code; (5) procedures to prepare for and respond to 
emergency situations; and (6) procedures for internal audits and management reviews. 
In the code’s guidelines, emphasis is placed on near-miss reporting and how to create an 
organizational atmosphere in which people are willing to report accidents and 
non-conformities by developing a just culture.  
 The concept of culture is known to be a fundamental element in James 
Reason’s [19] theory of safety culture and safety management also. Moreover, in order 
to achieve the development of an organizational safety culture, IMO identifies three key 
elements: (1) recognizing that accidents are preventable by following correct procedures 
and establishing best practices; (2) constantly thinking about safety; and (3) seeking 
continuous improvement. IMO’s approach and perspective to safety culture is 
apparently instrumental, where safety culture is seen as something that may be 
engineered by an organization’s structures and control systems in order to produce 
desired behavioral norms and accompanying safety outcomes. 
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 Molland [20].The main topics in the ISM Code are the emergency 
preparedness by establishing procedures and programs for drill and exercises (section 8), 
to ensure that the master is properly qualified for command, and is given the necessary 
support to perform his duties safely (section 6). Responsibilities and authority aboard 
the ship must be defined, and a person ashore having direct access to the highest level 
company management must be designated to provide a link between the company and 
those and board, to ensure the safe operation of the ship (section 4). The master's 
responsibility and authority is particularly defined (section 5), in particular 
implementing the policy, motivating the crew, issuing instructions, verifying that 
requirements are observed and reviewing the safety management system (SMS) for the 
ship. 
   
2.3.2 Regional Regulations 
 Kuo [21]. These regulations have been devised by one or more countries and 
the requirements have to be satisfied by ships entering the regional waters and generally, 
there is a correlation with international regulations. International regulations can be 
regarded as directives given by IMO to member states. They could then "fine tune" 
them in order to meet flag state's specific requirements. Sometimes of group of 
countries have similar problems and more coordinated approach would be more 
beneficial than each flag state action on its own. This is true while there are already 
formal arrangements for the group of nations to function in cooperative manner. 
 For example, the European Union (EU) has, in 2006, 25 members and it has 
regulations for maritime activities would tend interface well with international 
regulations. From time to time, one or two major maritime accidents occur and maritime 
safety raises its profile under media and public pressure. This type of situations often 
leads to calls for regional regulations to safeguard the maritime interest of the 
community.  
 
2.3.3 Flag State Regulations 
 Oltedal [22]. Under international law, it is the flag state which regulates all the 
ships registered in the country of the flag. Some of the regulations can be similar to 
international and regional ones but others are specified within the flag state. Each flag 
state may have a national register, second register, and/or open register. A national 
register is reserved to vessels with national ownership. Second registers, which are 
additional to national registers, are mostly open registers. In an open register, ships 
owned by foreign entities may register. The creation of second registers is a response to 
intensified competition in the market for ship registration. In the early 1980s, the 
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shipping market experienced a severe depression. Since the late 1980s, a number of 
states have created second registers in addition to their first national register in order to 
provide some or all of the advantages of an open register as a result of the economic 
crisis.  
 
2.3.4 PSC (Port State Control) 
 According to the IMO (International Maritime Organization) 
Port State Control (PSC) is the inspection of foreign ships in national ports to verify that 
the condition of the ship and its equipment comply with the requirements of 
international regulations and that the ship is manned and operated in compliance with 
these rules. 
 Many of IMO's most important technical conventions are provisions for ships 
to be inspected while they are visiting foreign ports to ensure that they meet IMO 
requirements. These inspections were originally intended to be a backup to flag State 
implementation, but experience has shown that they can be extremely effective, 
especially if organized on a regional basis. 
 This ensures that as many ships as possible are inspected but at the same time 
prevents ships being delayed by unnecessary inspections. The primary responsibility for 
ships' standards rests with the flag state but port state control provides a "safety net" to 
catch substandard ships. 
 Oltedal [23] IMO has encouraged the establishment of regional port State 
control organizations and agreements on port State control - Memoranda of 
Understanding or MoU’s - have been signed covering all of the world's oceans: Europe 
and the north Atlantic (Paris MoU); Asia and the Pacific (Tokyo MoU); Latin America 
(Acuerdo de Viña del Mar); Caribbean (Caribbean MoU); West and Central Africa 
(Abuja MoU); the Black Sea region (Black Sea MoU); the Mediterranean 
(Mediterranean MoU); the Indian Ocean (Indian Ocean MoU); and the Riyadh MoU. 
 
2.4 Responsibilities Human Elements in Safety Culture 
 The development of safety culture in international trade and shipping in today’s 
globalized market has to a large degree determined the regulative structure of the 
seaborne industry. The international regulative system is of high priority for the safety 
of ships and crew sailing on the seas, as every shipping company is required to relate to 
this during daily operations. In order to gain proper understanding of safety 
management within shipping, knowledge of the most important laws and the 
international regulative framework is necessary. 
 Having an effective safety culture is more and more considered as one way to 
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achieve the desired safety standards as it pays good attention to human behavior. The 
goal is to find ways to develop a positive attitude towards safety and encourage safe 
behavior to minimize human errors and violations. 
 In analyzing accidents, marine and non- marine, it has been noted that humans 
play a key role. Sometimes they are responsible for causing the accident and their 
actions sometimes have increased to prevent catastrophic incidents. While technology 
interactions with humans are how people behave during work and their attitudes while a 
part in contribute to the accident. It is important features are known in others factors 
such as media and management.  
 In Kuo [24] pointed out that: 
The main features of safety culture can be considered under the following headings: 
Safety thinking is safety culture related to how people think about safety in the context 
of what they are doing in a variety of activities and the decisions are made.  
Human behavior is about how humans will behave in various situations. 
Attitudes is influenced by the attitude held can vary from a very responsible and 
positive attitude to irresponsible and negative attitudes.  
 
2.5 Implementation Safety of “Human Elements” in 4M (Man, Machine, Media, 
Management) Factors 
 In the maritime system established by Rothblum [25], people-related human 
elements include knowledge, skill, abilities, memory, motivation and alertness.
 Kuo [26] incorporated the following human elements into safety systems: 
personal capabilities including both intellectual capabilities and physical capabilities; 
the influence of personal characteristics (such as personality, response to stress, attitude 
and leadership and teamwork qualities) on performance; the influence of hardware, 
software, and the working environment on human beings’ performance; and the impact 
of the safety culture on human beings’ behavior.  
 Clearly, the human elements commonly identified in maritime system are 
people abilities and limitations, the influences of man, machine media, and management. 
Taking into account the characteristic of maritime accidents within the human elements 
to be explored in this dissertation mainly focuses on the unsafe actions of seafarers, and 
the underlying contributors such as the operators’ personality that have a deep influence 
on the operator’s performance. The external elements including the environment, the 
society and ship itself that have a direct contact with operators will be deemed as one 
aspects of the human elements. The detail of these human elements, found by 
approaching one aspect such as unsafe actions in the taxonomy (classification) error will 
be discussed in chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORIES OF ACCIDENT CAUSATION 
 
 It is important to recognize that a product or system is designed then given 
input by humans. Humans are using product, making decisions, taking action, 
modifying, and ignoring instructions. It is really important to know how to create so that 
humans can produce a good performance from their own perspective. 
 This chapter describes an overview of humans in accident causation viewed 
from several factors that are the element of human factors such as physical, 
physiological factors, psychological factors and psychosocial; and their limitations. 
Additionally is the need to recognize accident causation not only from unsafe actions 
because in other studies there are theories unsafe conditions. 
 
3.1 Human Factors 
 Investigations about accident have identified many causes contributing to their 
occurrence. The fact that human error contributed to the accidents is generally accepted 
but there is no consequence of the importance of this factor. Regarding the proportion of 
marine accidents caused by human errors varies from 50 percent to 90 percent of the 
total. P & I Club reports covering the years 1987 to 1991 support these statistics and 
point to claims, especially in terms of cargoes, pollution, collisions, property damages 
and injuries to both crew and non-crew. Firstly, in 60 percent of the total number of 
claims recorded, human error was a direct cause, and over 30 percent human error was 
an indirect contributions Kuo [27]. 
 The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) [28] of the United 
Kingdom Department of the Environment publishes an annual report of maritime 
accidents. For the year 1999, the MAIB noted the relative causal factors of maritime 
accidents involving death. Summarizes their findings about 37 % of accidents leading to 
death are attributable to human factors. Looking deeper, 25% is attributable to “working 
methods” and an additional 17 % to “movement about ship”. In the United States, the 
human factors and ergonomics community considered working methods and movement 
about the ship to be within the scope of human factors/ergonomic concerns (e.g., task 
and vessel design and procedural practices). 
 Feyer, et al. [29]. In the context of the safety of maritime systems, “human 
factors” covers “a wide range of elements involved in the interaction between 
individuals and their working environment.  
 UK Health and Safety Executive [30] the phrase “human factors” means:  
The perceptual, mental and physical capabilities of people and the interaction of 
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individuals within job and working environments, the influence of equipment and 
system design on human performance, and, above all, the organizational characteristics, 
which influence safety-related behavior at work. 
 Both the above quoted in Petersen, D [31], L. Zhejiang [32] definitions cover 
the human beings’ capabilities, jobs and working environment, the effects of system 
designs on human performance and organizational characteristics. These are really 
important observations with a number of human element related initiatives charged with 
developing and providing effective means to design equipment for human use, and to 
address man, machine, media, management that are proven to minimize the human 
error. 
 
3.2 Scoping Human Elements Involved 
 Here, some important information is conveyed. First, human beings are treated 
as a component of a system. In this system, there are still some other components. So 
the term “human elements” may be used to refer to human beings’ functions and 
performances in the system.  
 As mentioned in [33], human element is a component of a system. For the task 
of exploring the impacts of human elements involving casualties in incidents or 
accidents, it is necessary to identify all human elements involved in safety in maritime 
transport system. 
 
3.2.1 Relation in Personality 
 In the personality of a human being there are several things that must be 
considered then and then developed by the individual. Here are some important things 
to consider about factors in human within personality (see in table 3.1) IMO [34] 
Table 3.1 Human personality 
Within a personality 
Limitations 
Factors in humans Element in humans 
1. Physical factors  
Description : physical capability of the 
individual to perform required actions 
and movements 
Age; sex; strength; weight, 
sitting; height; reach, etc. 
 
1.Memory 
2. Workload 
3. Attitude 
4. Personality 
traits 
5. Experience 
6. Knowledge 
7. Training 
2. Physiological factors. 
Description: 
Physiological condition of individual 
including stable and transitory states 
which could affect the individual’s 
Nutritional factors; health, 
stress; fatigue; communication 
skills; mood; reaction time 
error rates; sensory limitations; 
Illusions; alcohol; drugs, 
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situational awareness and behavior. partial incapacitation. 
3. Psychological factors. 
Description: Maintaining situational 
awareness is paramount to ensuring 
safe voyage.  
Information processing, with 
consider about sensing, 
perception, decision making, 
action and feedback. 
4. Psychosocial. 
Description: 
Individual’s approach to situation, 
include any event or condition in the 
individual’s social environment. 
Personal loss, interpersonal 
conflicts, financial problems, 
significant life style changes, 
family pressure, culture 
differences. 
Source: IMO, 2000 
 
3.2.2 Relations in a Maritime System  
 The culture of an organization can be defined as the way to do things around 
environment working such as culture provides a context for action which binds together 
the different factors. They are influenced by the factors 4 M (Man, Machine, Media and 
Management) in the maritime system. Maritime system covers conditions of activities 
in shipping which have beneficial values and social effects to every country. Pointed out 
from Rothblum [35] as mentioned earlier, the maritime system is a people system 
(fig.3.1). People interact with technology, environment, and organizational factors. 
Sometimes the weak link is with the people themselves; but more often the weak link is 
the way that technological, environmental, or organizational factors influence the way 
people perform. Let’s look at each of these factors. 
Media
Man Management
Machine
Safety Culture
 
Fig.3.1. Maritime system in 4M (Man, Machine, Media and Management) factors  
Regarding in fig. 3.1, can be described as follows: 
 The man of the maritime system is includes the ship’s crew, pilots, dock 
workers, Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) operators, and others. The performance of these 
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people will be dependent on many characteristic of both innate and learned behavior. As 
human beings, all have certain abilities and limitations. For example, there isn’t a 
machine in the world that can interpret a radar screen as well as a trained human being 
can. On the other hand, we are fairly limited in our memory capacity and in our ability 
to calculate numbers quickly and accurately. Machines can do a much better job. In 
addition to these inborn characteristics, human performance is influenced by knowledge 
and skills also. It has acquired, as well as by internal regulators such as motivation and 
alertness. 
 The design of machine or technology is influenced by how people perform. 
People come in certain sizes and have limited strength. For example, a manned machine 
that is designed to be used outdoors only has a key-board entry password that cannot be 
entered by gloved hands/fingers; or a cut-off valve that is positioned out of easy reach. 
Both will have a detrimental effect on performance.   
Automation is often designed without much thought to the information that the user 
needs to access. Critical information is sometimes either not displayed at all or else 
displayed in a manner which is not easy to interpret. Poor design can lead to inadequate 
comprehension of the state of the system and to poor decision making.  
 The condition of the environment or media can also affect of human 
performance. By environment are included not only weather and other aspects of the 
physical work environment (such as lighting, noise, and temperature), but also the 
regulatory and economic climates. The physical work environment directly affects one’s 
ability to perform. For example, the human body performs best within a fairly restricted 
temperature range. Performance will be degraded at temperatures outside that range, 
and fail altogether in extreme temperatures. High sea states and ship vibrations can 
affect locomotion and manual dexterity, as well as cause stress and fatigue. Tight 
economic conditions can increase the probability of risk-taking (e.g., keeping schedule 
at all costs).  
 The condition of management includes crew organization and company 
policies and these also affect human performance. Limitations of crew size and training 
decisions directly affect crew workload and their capabilities to perform safely and 
effectively. A strict hierarchical command structure can inhibit effective teamwork, 
whereas free, interactive communications can enhance it. Work schedules which do not 
provide the individual with regular and sufficient sleep time produce fatigue. Company 
policies with respect to meeting schedules and working safely will directly influence the 
degree of risk-taking behavior and operational safety. In establishing the structure of a 
maritime system, the components such as operator, ship environment and society are 
considered. Accident occurrence has also been included into the system structure.  
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3.3 Human Error 
 The majority of accidents occur due to human actions in making decisions or 
taking action. But in addition to unsafe actions are also considered unsafe conditions. 
Because of numerous condition hazards in the workplace it is not always possible to 
identify and eliminate all but an effective accident investigation program is very 
important to know critical data of behavior in taxonomy error. Accident prevention can 
be assisted by identifying the root cause of the accident, and this is made possible by 
techniques such as accident investigation theory and the theory of human error causing 
accidents. 
 
3.3.1 Heinrich Domino theory  
 Hosseinian et al. [36] describes about Heinrich was the pioneer in the accident 
causation theories. He proposed that the accidents causation theory between man and 
machine has a relationship in the term of frequency and severity of action. Abdelhamid, 
T, et al. [37] The unsafe actions are considered wherefore the management role is 
needed approach to accident prevention, costs of accidents and the impact of safety on 
efficiency. According to statistics on accident reports Heinrich deduced that 88 percent 
of accidents are due to unsafe actions of workers, 10 percent due to unsafe conditions 
and 2 percent of all accidents are associated with act of God such as natural disasters or 
force majeure. Fred A.Manuele [38] describes that according to Heinrich, man failure is 
the problem and psychology is an important element in correcting it. Selection of 
remedies is based- on practical cause-analysis that stop at the selection of first 
proximate and most easily prevented causes in the selection of remedies (See fig. 3. 2). 
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Fig.3.2 Domino theory of accident causation 
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Heinrich established the ‘Domino theory’ which is based on five sequential factors as 
following, Taylor, G,et al. [39]:  
a. Ancestry and social environment. Ancestry and social environment are the process of 
acquiring knowledge of customs and skills in the workplace. Lack of skills and 
knowledge of performing tasks, inappropriate social and environmental conditions will 
lead to faults of person.  
b. Faults of person (carelessness). Faults of person or carelessness are negative features 
of a person’s personality although these unwanted characteristics might be acquired. 
The result of carelessness is unsafe act/conditions.  
c. Unsafe actions and/or mechanical or physical condition. Unsafe actions/conditions 
include the errors and technical failures which cause the accident.  
d. Accident. Accidents are caused by unsafe acts/conditions and subsequently lead to 
injuries  
e. Injury. Injuries are the consequences of the accidents. 
 The Heinrich’s domino theory is comprised of five standing dominos which 
will fall one after the other if the first domino (Ancestry and social environment) falls. 
The accident can be prevented only if the chain of sequence is disturbed, e.g. the unsafe 
actions/conditions can be eliminated in order to prevent the accidents and associated 
injuries. Heinrich’s domino theory was credited for the process of simplifying the 
human behavior control in accidents. Heinrich domino theory became the basis for 
many other studies on accident causation models with the emphasis on management’s 
role in accident prevention; these studies are called Management Model or Domino’s 
Updated Model. Management models believe that the management system is 
responsible for occurrence of accidents. 
 
3.3.2 The ‘Swiss Cheese’ Model  
 Ridley, J. et al. [40]. The ‘Swiss Cheese’ accident causation model was first 
developed by James Reason (1970-1977) as a linear accident causation model. The 
theory is currently widely used since it simply suggests that the organizations tries to 
prevent accidents by defenses in order not to allow the risks and hazards become loss 
(see fig.3.3). These organizational defenses are divided into two groups:  
1. Hard defenses are automatic alarming systems, physical obstacles, engineered safety 
appliances and weak points included into the main system for protection such as fuses.  
2. Soft defenses are dependent upon the personnel and procedures, regulations of 
required performance, investigation, checking, regular procedures of performance, 
education and training, supervision and working permission. Soft defenses also involve 
supervisors and operators as the pioneers. Losses to people, equipment, assets are the 
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potential consequences of hazards in an organization. 
 Reason claims that a trade-off exists between the level of protection provided 
for the product and the production. The risks included in any product should be 
defended by the organization for the well-being of customers but the level of safety and 
protection should be equivalent to the risks associated with the work overview in 
Seyyed S. H, et al. [41]. If the level of protection is higher than required then the 
company will not be commercially profitable and if the protection level is less than the 
associated risks the occurrence of accident is susceptible and the organization will lose 
the business opportunities. The equilibrium between the protection and the production is 
essential for the durable commercial survival of the business; since the production 
process is visible the product can be managed and inspected for the desired output but 
the level of protection can be measured only after the inadequacy is determined. See in 
fig.3.3.  
Organisational failures at the 
management level  (Latent failures)
Barriers (if they exist) with 
intrinsic or typical defects 
(windows of oppurtunity)
Supervisory failures 
(latent failures)
Unsafe conditions (pre 
condition for unsafe 
actions)
Unsafe actions (Active 
failures/immediate causes)
Automatic safety devices
Warning systems
Procedures and training
 
Fig.3.3 Swiss cheese Accident Causation Model (James Reason, 1970-77) 
 Although organizational accident defenses are seen as obstacles which prevent 
the hazards from converting into losses, the obstacles and barriers have holes in them 
like slices of Swiss cheese. Reason called his model Swiss cheese because of theses 
defects in the organizational defenses. The foremen of an organization are in charge of 
the sharp-end procedures which represent the “unsafe actions” slices of cheese in the 
model. The holes in the unsafe actions slices are the human errors or unsafe actions. 
Reason believed that accidents are caused by active failures and immediate causes 
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which are the results of mistakes, slips and violations of standards. Accidents can be 
either caused by singular human error or a combination of them as immediate causes of 
accidents; the combination of violation and mistake is a very usual cause of accidents. 
There have been a lot of improvements in technology and engineering and that means 
that technical failures should be eliminated. Therefore most of the time human error is 
blamed to be the major cause of accidents. In fact, the more improvements have been 
achieved in technology and engineering, the more the number of accidents caused by 
human error are reported. Unsafe conditions are represented by holes in the next slice of 
Reason. Swiss cheese model: the unsafe conditions and the psychological risk factors 
are the contributory factors to unsafe actions of workers. Unlike active failures and 
immediate causes in previous slice, the holes in this slice are the hidden contributory 
factors of accident. The relationship between unsafe conditions and unsafe actions are a 
one to many interactions. Unsafe conditions can lead to many hazards and unsafe 
actions in pointed out Stranks J. W. [42].  
 
3.3.3 Accident Root Causes Tracing Model (ARCTM)  
 Fang, D.et al. [43]. This model is Accident Root Causes Tracing Model 
(ARCTM) it shows further advances from many of the previous accident models. Many 
important rules of the model have been derived from the effort of Heinrich (1959), 
Petersen (1971), Bird (1974), Ferrell ((as referenced in Heinrich et al. (1980)), and 
Petersen (1982). The main concept proposed in ARCTM is that an occupational 
accident will occur due to one or more of the following three root causes. 
a. Not identifying unsafe conditions that existed before an activity was started or that 
develop after an activity was started. 
b. Not deciding whether the next action is right, even after the worker identifies the 
existence of unsafe condition (ignoring unsafe condition). 
c. Deciding to take unsafe actions regardless of initial conditions of the work 
environment. 
 Clearly, these root causes develop because of different reasons, and also point 
to different issues that should be considered for corrective actions. ARCTM was 
designed to guide the investigator through a series of questions and possible answers to 
identify a root cause for why the accident occurred and to investigate how the root cause 
developed and how it could be eliminated. 
 
3.4 Safety Response Model (SRM) - Summary 
 Investigation of the accident should be based on the root cause of the problem. 
Generally the root cause of the problem comes from unsafe conditions and unsafe 
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actions or otherwise when unsafe actions were caused by unsafe conditions. Events 
have occurred that will accumulate regardless of whether human behavior is evidenced 
by human error, human factors or human elements. Every event has the probability of a 
risk, but in following the developments and lessons learnt from prior accidents 
previously studied, newer methods can minimize levels of accidents. 
 When looking further about the accidents that occurred in the maritime 
management system, there is no single causation factor; the work environment is a 
reciprocal relationship between man, machine and media in maritime management 
system. Accident investigation is generally a way of result finding: an investigation's 
analysis of the factors contributing to the accident and recommendations, the 
investigation's suggestions as to how similar accidents could be prevented. Results of 
findings need to be used to apply to standard safety rules to help rearrange events to be 
safe. When it is implemented, the priority of safety will be known. 
 Relationships of factors that are intended to produce a strong safety culture in 
workplace, and which is supported by the right decision (fig. 3.4). The root causes 
analysis will be explained in Chapter 5 to show the relationship in maritime accidents.  
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CHAPTER 4 
PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION (PIN) SAFE MODEL FOR UNSAFE ACTIONS 
IN THE DESIGN OF SAFETY CRITICAL SYSTEMS 
 
 Human factors within human elements are contributing to risk in safety 
critical systems. However, current approaches to integrating human element issues in 
the development of safety critical systems appear not fully sufficient.  
 Human error is a part that cannot be separated from the human element 
because it influences the actualization of a person's action or performance.  
Personal Identification (PIN) Safe is modeled to devise a systematic identification of 
substandard, unsafe actions and critical events associated with characteristic maritime 
accidents.  
 This section’s results are researched of the human elements that produce 
unsafe actions when interacting with equipment and other systems. Procedures 
develop deviations which become human error instigated unsafe actions. This is 
particularly true of collision accidents and human casualties. Depending on the social 
atmosphere of the working environment, limitations of self can be attributed as cause 
for accidents. This model will be an opportunity to improve safety culture at sea. 
 
4.1 Overview Countermeasures in Unsafe Actions 
 Ian Sommerville [44]. A critical system is any system whose ‘failure’ could 
threaten human life, the system’s environment or the existence of the organization 
which operates the system. Failure in this context does not mean failure to conform to a 
specification but means any potentially threatening system behavior, so it can also be 
said that the failure is “unsafe actions”.  
Socio-technical critical systems have failures that often occur, including the following: 
Hardware failure 
Hardware fails because of design and manufacturing errors or because components have 
reached the end of their natural life. 
Software failure 
Software fails due to errors in its specification, design or implementation. 
Operational failure 
Human operators make mistakes. Now perhaps the largest single cause of system 
failures. People and operational processes are very important elements of critical 
systems. Systems have properties which are emergent. 
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 Risk reduction is a key factor in the design of safety in critical systems. Human 
error is an essential part during the risk reduction process. When a system is operational 
a human may create failure and the system itself is design so that it can be provide the 
help needed to overcome it. The integration of human factors analysis into systems 
design is traditionally a difficult problem. Author and designers need to be able to 
explore and evaluate solutions. 
 In this chapter an approach is presented that allows the design of risk reduction 
and safety barriers and that supports barrier implementation.  
 
4.2 Integrated PIN Safe Design in Unsafe Actions  
 Leading operational system with latent safety may create adverse effects, e.g. 
hazards, to system itself, or to its environment. A design team will use tools to identify 
such potential hazards. If humans participate in a system, designers may resort to well 
established human factors methods such as human reliability analysis (HRA), THERP4, 
or HEART5, or to human factor experts.  
 Reliability of a safety critical system is vital when there are risks for human 
beings in its environment, such as unsafe actions in a maritime accident. These people 
may interact with the system or not. In safety critical systems, people need to be aware 
of these risks and know what to do in the case of problems. Based on these reasons, 
Personal Identification (PIN) Safe method is done in logic of pattern as value within 
human beings. In the structure within management information (see fig.4.1) is an 
important issue. It takes the form of experience feedback of every seafarer, and 
incorporates traceability and various types of information system to know path and 
processes interact in the working environment.  
 Other ways in this chapter have been attempted to give the structure of 
Personal Identification (PIN) Safe model as a systematic identification of unsafe actions 
with the processing of characteristic accidents on a ship. A comprehensive PIN Safe 
should be done to eliminate or to control during the operational in lifetime of a ship 
particularly unsafe actions. Both the engineering and the management of measuring 
instruments, especially databases that are in place to control process parameters, should 
be addressed. How these controls are degraded by technical failures, human failures or 
external failures, to lead to undesired events, constitutes an elaborate part of PIN Safe. 
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Fig.4.1 Strategy of Personal Identification (PIN) Safe model at maritime accidents 
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4.2.1 PIN Safe in Identification of Unsafe Actions 
 In an incident investigation, the investigator starts with the immediate actions 
and events surrounding the incident and then works backwards to uncover contributing 
causes. In terms of human error, those immediately linked to the incident are typically 
“unsafe actions”. Thus, investigators must dig deeper into why the unsafe actions took 
place. As pointed out Anita Rothblum [45], as a first step, it is useful to consider any 
preconditions for unsafe actions. There are two major subdivisions of unsafe conditions 
(preconditions): substandard conditions of the operators and the substandard practices 
as they are committed. Substandard conditions are broken down from attribution of 
causes interacting with adverse mental states, adverse physiological states, and 
physical/mental limitations. Types of substandard practices include crew resource 
mismanagement and personal readiness. Each of these subcategories is discussed in the 
model of the characteristic of the human element in analyzing data. 
 
4.2.2 PIN Safe in Management Strategy 
 Fig. 4.1, shows the accident/incident causation model. This is a key to 
understanding the kind of barriers that are needed to contain the propagation of an 
unwanted event. The model shows that the basic initiating events of any undesired event 
are technical failure, human failure or external failures or a combination thereof. Human 
beings are the weakest link in any engineering system S.G. Kariuki, et al. [46]. This is 
due to the fact that all engineering systems rely on human intervention in some respect. 
However, many methods do not give human failure the weight it deserves as a major 
contributor to unwanted events. Human failure is more complex than just a single 
operator action. To comprehensively address human failure, a broader perspective of the 
process of the voyage on board should be envisaged. 
Strong management is needed to have the right time information at the real time and 
under the right format. Controlling a situation is not only a matter of availability of 
information or data. It is also a matter of knowledge and how to control process 
information (fig.4.2) Rivai,H.,et al. [47].  
 
Fig.4.2  3A(Awareness,Action,Attitude) in control behavior 
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Table 4.1  3A in control behavior 
Awareness 
Awareness is the expression or ability to perceive, 
to feel, or to be conscious of events, objects, or 
sensory patterns. In this level of consciousness, 
sense data can be confirmed by an observer 
without necessarily implying understanding. 
Awareness of expression of decision-making is 
appropriated for retaining an item/part/equipment, 
restoring its given condition. Incorrect, incomplete 
or unclear planning of maintenance or operability 
verification actions such as maintenance, servicing, 
installation, alignment, corrective, inspection or 
functional testing phases of work. Deficiencies in 
definition of decision of work scope, work order, 
operation order or procedure. 
M 
o 
n 
i 
t 
o 
r 
i 
n 
g 
Monitoring is 
generally 
means to be 
aware of the 
state of a 
system or 
condition of 
equipment and 
reflects on the 
effects of 
maintenance 
actions because 
of errors or 
deficiencies in 
the design or 
modification of 
documentation, 
equipment, 
systems, 
installations or 
computer 
programs. 
 
Action 
Action is process of doing something, to achieve 
an aim. Action of decision-making is taken in 
response to sudden and unexpected incidents. 
Because of the lack of knowledge or poor 
information on the violation, so specific training on 
human behavior in emergencies is given so that 
deviation violations can be minimized. 
Attitude 
Attitude is steady way of thinking or feeling about 
something. Attitude of decision-making is 
considered as the ability to coordinate to control 
operations of equipment or systems. 
Methodological is the ability to explain the actions 
taken and methods used. Learning is the ability to 
analyze about incidents, accidents and operational 
experience. Mindfulness is needed everyday 
activities because lack of training, of specialist or 
cross functional knowledge for the tasks or their 
planning. 
 
4.2.3 PIN Safe in Anticipation of Engineering Controls  
 This includes anticipation of all human factors. Initiating events as unsafe 
actions will lead to process deviations. Measurement parameters in all operations by 
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approaching by logic of patterns (Appendix-B) can help to suggest for improve 
motivation of self. Censoring of equipment by ergonomics design, it is useful to help to 
reach good performance in the working environment. 
 Knowledge of working environment is one part of the risk value of an 
individual ship and can indicate the probability of an accident for that ship for a given 
time and location. Fig. 4.3 Rivai.et al. [48] shows the probability of failures that exist in 
a navigation system that itself is influenced by several factors. The ship navigation 
system comprises ship, navigation environment, and navigation technology, all of which 
consist of different parts. 
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PSC and Flag non- 
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 Environmental 
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Weather 
Tide and Current
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Effect
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Fig.4.3 Condition of failure in navigation system  
 The accident probability for an individual ship is determined using so called 
“exposures” and a casualty rate. The exposures are the number of potential casualty 
sensitive situations in which the ship can be involved that could lead to an accident. For 
example, the exposure of collisions is an encounter between two ships. By relating these 
exposures with the actual casualties from the accident database, the casualty rates for 
the different accident types are derived Koldenhof,Y. et al.[49].When observing boating 
accidents, the failure probabilities are distinguished from the corresponding exposures, 
i.e.  
Nautical miles. The nautical mile exposures are simply the time multiplied with the 
speed of the ship. The nautical miles are the basis for the calculation of the probability 
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that a ship will be in an accident of the type such as founder, hull failure, engine failure 
or fire/explosion. 
Encounter. The exposure measure for a collision is an encounter between two or more 
ships. There are two modes of the model. The first mode of the model, the collision risk, 
is calculated based on the average number of encounters for a ship per hour in the area. 
This model can be used to determine the average levels of risk in order to implement 
mitigating measures. In the second mode, the collision risk is calculated by the actual 
position, speed and course of all other ships in the area. 
Stranding effect. The drifting contact occurs when a ship near the stranding line or fixed 
object experiences a failure in the propulsion engine or in the steering equipment. Since 
the ship slowly becomes uncontrollable as it loses speed, the combined effect of wind, 
waves and current may carry it towards the stranding line (or object). If dropping to 
anchor does not help or is impossible and the time for repairing exceeds the available 
time, the ship may cross the stranding line, which means that the ship grounds. This 
generally happens at a low speed. 
Ramming effect. The ramming contact occurs when a ship is on a contact course with 
the stranding line, which means that a navigational error occurs. This error is undetected 
until the point of no return, and then the ship has contact with the stranding line (i.e. the 
ship grounds). The collision may be at the high or low speed depending on the time 
lapse between the point of no return and/or the implementation of corrective action after 
the detection of the error. 
 Flohberger, M, L. [50]. If a deviation proceeds uncorrected it may lead to an 
accident event. Engineering and management controls are protective measures which 
should be evaluated to establish how well the system could resist degradation due to a 
critical event. Condition on the dynamic behavior of the ship responsible for replicating 
the behavior of actual vessels in response to the actuators and the environment. The 
underlying dynamic model of the vessel must model both the rudder and the engine as 
they are the main actuators used during maneuvering as pointed out Karl Gunnar, et al. 
[51]. Taxonomy error as substandard unsafe actions of seafarer are an important part of 
the environment during navigation and maneuvering, and an experimental frame which 
is expected to accommodate in PIN Safe model of this process must include both the 
effects of the environment on the dynamics and the connection between the navigator 
and the environment. These controls include alarms, procedures, operator intervention, 
emergency relief and evacuation among others and are used when calculating the 
probability of risk value estimation. Maintaining to reduce unsafe actions is still 
important, though, in critical situations. 
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4.2.4 The Patterns of Unsafe Action in Risk Monitoring 
 Kirwan, et al. [52].Critical events have consequences, which have potential 
impact to accidents. Every accident that occurs when there has been interaction within 
unsafe actions of the seafarer in the working environment. Such interactions will have 
own characteristics or patterns.  
 Risk is the probability and severity of loss from exposure to the hazard. The 
assessment step is application of quantitative, qualitative or combined measures to 
determine the level of risk associated with a specific hazard. This process defines that 
will be easier to recognize taxonomy error in performance of seafarer. The probability 
weight (Appendix-C) within taxonomy error and severity of accident that could result 
from a hazard are based upon the exposures of unsafe personal actions. Personal 
exposures act as a key to developing human performance.  
 During operations workers will be affected by a given event or over time by 
repetitious event. Regarding these situations, the author has researched methods in 
controlling of taxonomy error of unsafe actions until within 4M factors as 
comprehensive monitoring information processing database. Those are needed for the 
role of management to evaluate. Strong management to identify every characteristic of 
unsafe actions is important in establishing the evaluation strategies. Evaluation of 
taxonomy error of unsafe actions till within 4M factors are one way to find a strategy to 
develop performance shaping factors for the seafarer to reach protective capacities. 
 The third type of exposure is as table 4.2: 
Controlling 1:Hazard exposures monitoring.  
Mapping in probability weight as information processing can help determine the level 
of exposures to the hazard and can recorded through database information of seafarers 
as protective capacity. This can be expressed in the terms of time, proximity, volume or 
repetition. Repeated exposure to hazard increases the probability of an accident 
occurring. Understanding that the exposure level can aid in determining the severity or 
probability of the risk in maritime accidents. Additional it measures a guide for devising 
control measure to limit exposures. 
Controlling 2: Hazard severity monitoring.  
Determining the severity of the hazard in terms of potential impact on the people, 
equipment or mission. Severity monitoring in database information processing should 
be based upon the worst possible outcome that can be reasonably expected. Severity 
categories are defined to provide in probability weight measure, one way to help prevent 
the worst credible accident resulting from limitations of human interrelations between 
environmental conditions, design inadequacies, procedural deficiencies, or system, sub 
system or component failure or malfunction within 4M factors. 
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Controlling 3: Probability monitoring.  
Determining the probability that the hazard will be caused by risk in the term of severity 
as monitored in condition controlling I have mentioned above. Probability weight is 
considered in proportion to the cumulative probability of the identified unsafe action for 
risk (chapter 5). Assigning a measure accident to new strategy or system may be 
possible to implement in the planning process. An intelligent decision system will be 
created in the future research. 
  
Table 4.2  3 keys in control of exposures 
Controlling Features Expressed Comprehensive aspect 
Controlling 1 Hazard 
exposures 
monitoring 
proximity; 
volume, 
repetition 
 
Media
Man Management
Machine
Safety Culture
 
 
Controlling 2 Severity 
monitoring 
potential impact 
on the people; 
equipment; 
mission; 
Controlling 3 Probability 
monitoring 
determined 
through unsafe 
actions in actual 
numbers; 
 
 Combinations of these in analysis can help result to minimize exposures on 
accident, to improve protective capacities in psychological factors based on IMO 
investigation of human factors. The further aspects can help and encourage 
self-regulations where possible as part effort to help develop a safety culture in the 
industry. 
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CHAPTER 5 
IDENTIFICATION OF UNSAFE ACTIONS IN RISK 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Analyzing the human elements in accident of maritime system based on the 
statutory obligation to investigate marine casualties is in all main IMO/ILO 
Conventions. IMO Code A.849 (20) as amended by A.884 (21) for the investigation of 
marine casualties and incidents is widely applied although it is only a recommendation 
until now.  
 
5.2 Source Data 
 The source data report that kinds of maritime accidents in the period 
1998-2008 by Marine Accident Inquiring Agency (MAIA), Japan. The Japan Marine 
Accident Inquiry Agency (JMAIA), since October 2008 merged with the ARAIC (Air 
and Rail) and now known as the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) is the Japanese 
government agency that investigated causes of accidents on ships. MAIA (Marine 
Accident Inquiry Agency) data search. The report of MAIA written that maritime 
accidents are selected as the main source for collecting the human element data 
involved in accident at sea. 
 Unfortunately, the author did not have about the report of investigation of 
maritime accident from JTSB (Japan Transport Safety Board). Author tries to explain 
scenarios relating to the causes of accidents associated by the frequency kind of 
maritime accidents has been happened by starting to analyze the human element as a 
factor that contributed the accident, the initially investigation began to study unsafe 
actions (as seen in fig. 1.1 and fig.1.2) and the others data report have written about 
percentage unsafe actions of maritime accidents in 1998-2008 as shows in table 5.1, and 
others value such as 0 means not found data about accident. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
Table 5.1.Percentage unsafe actions of maritime accidents in 1998-2008 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Improper management for ship
operation
X1 0.7 1.4 0.7 0.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 2.4 1.4 3 2.9 16.9 1.5
Poor repair condition  on ship
structure
X2 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.6 2.1 1.4 0.8 1.2 1.3 10.5 0.9
Poor preparation for sea X3 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.6 1.2 5.1 0.5
Improper hydrographic survey
before sailing
X4 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.3 3.3 2.3 2.1 1.8 3.3 2.4 2.2 26.6 2.4
Inadequate passage pallning X5 2.1 1.9 1.3 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.4 1.7 2.5 2.4 2.7 24.1 2.2
Improper ship handling X6 2.6 2.9 3.1 2.2 3 2.4 2.6 2.2 3.3 3.5 2.3 30.1 2.8
Unconfirmed ship's position X7 4.1 4 4.2 4.7 3 4.3 3.9 3.5 5.6 4.9 4.1 46.3 4.2
Improper look-out X8 30.4 27.9 30.6 32.6 35.1 33.9 33.2 29.6 29.7 29.2 30.1 342.3 31.1
Fatigue X9 6.2 5.5 5.6 6.1 7.3 6.3 6.2 5.8 7.4 6.9 7.6 70.9 6.4
Insuffient maintenance  and
wrong handling of  steering
systems and nautical instruments
X10 0.1 0.1 0.4 0 0 0.2 0 0.2 0.1 0 0.5 1.6 0.2
Poor attention to  meteorological
and oceanographical information
X11 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.7 2.8 2.1 1.4 3 2.1 2.3 2 22.6 2.1
Improper anchoring and
mooring
X12 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.6 0.8 11.8 1.1
Inadequate preparation for rough
sea
X13 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.6 1.3 1.7 1.3 8.7 0.8
No indication of navigation
lights and shapes
X14 1.4 2 1.1 2.2 1.4 1.3 1.8 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.8 14 1.2
Signalling  failure X15 6.2 5.9 6.8 5.2 5.8 5.9 6.2 7.1 5.2 5.4 4.7 64.4 5.8
Improper ship's speed X16 4.4 3.3 4.1 4.3 0.7 1.5 2.4 3.2 1.9 0.9 0.4 27.1 2.5
Ignoring COLREGS X17 12.2 12.9 12.1 10.5 11.3 11.9 11.1 10.8 9.7 9.1 8.7 120.3 11
Main engine failure X18 4.4 4.8 4.6 3.4 2.1 4.9 5.3 4.7 4.2 4.9 4.1 47.4 4.3
Auxiliary engine failure X19 1.5 2.6 3.1 3.3 2.2 1.5 1.5 2.9 1.8 1.2 1.7 23.3 2.1
Poor management of lubricant
oil
X20 2.8 2.5 1.8 3.7 3.3 2.6 1.9 1.7 1.6 2.5 2.9 27.3 2.5
Poor management  of  electrical
equipment
X21 0.5 1 0.9 1.3 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.5 8.7 0.8
Improper handling and other
task
X22 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.7 1.4 3.1 2.2 2.8 2.4 19.8 1.8
Improper fishing work X23 0.5 0.8 0.5 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.9 0.5 1 1.3 1.5 9.4 0.9
Poor management of passenger
and cargo loading
X24 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.6 1.2 6.5 0.6
Inadequate supervision of
working on board
X25 8.1 7.6 6.7 4.4 6.3 6.1 5.3 6.3 7.4 5.5 7.8 71.5 6.5
Inadequate report and   taking
over watch
X26 3.3 3.3 2.4 3.2 1.9 1.7 2.1 2.5 1.8 1.9 2 26.1 2.4
Poor management  fire X27 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.5 5.6 0.5
Force majeure X28 0.3 0.1 0.3 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0 0.2 0.1 0.2 1.5 0.1
Others X29 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.9 1.7 1.9 1.8 9.1 0.8
      Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1100 100
Unsafe actions causes of  marine
accidents
Variable 
Year
Total %
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 The database which have these scenarios are given as an alternative ways to see 
the effect of unsafe actions that led to impact to losses at workspace, particularly in 
maritime field. 
 
5.3 Data Analysis 
 Data analysis is obtained the whole of report to work on this research, establish 
a series of caused of parameters. These cause parameters as unsafe actions will be 
explained that the several ways how to studied factor appears. The root cause of the 
accident should be reviewed from several factors, such as previous explanation in 
chapter 2 and 3 is that the factors to be considered in the maritime system is man, 
machine, media and management. These were one way to minimize the effects of losses 
that will be occurred (fig. 5.1). 
Data Parameter
Unsafe action 1safe acti  Unsafe action 2 Unsafe action 3 Unsafe action... N
Standard safety 1 Standard safety 2 Standard safety 3 Standard safety ...N 
decisions decisions decisions
Media
Man
ManagementMachine
Root  Causes Analysis
4M (Man,Machine,Media, Management ) Factor
Result
Collision Stranding Sinking Capsizing Missing
Operation 
Inhibitor
Fire Equipment 
Damage
Engine 
Failure
Safety
Inhibitor
Flooding
Distress
Explosion Facilities 
Damage
Casualty
   Fig. 5.1 Casualty of parameter 
  One by one will be described from sources in printed theories and from 
opinion of experts, from real accident report as well as result of exposure in unsafe 
actions. 
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1. Improper management for ship operation 
 Fig.5.2 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as improper 
management for ship operation will lead to casualty, engine failure and collision are 
cases reach highest number of maritime accidents.  
 One of root cause is failed communication. Communication is more important 
during operation working, one of example communication breakdown approach 
formation maneuver, the maneuver should be aborted if appropriate and safe to do so 
and the subsequent actions taken by each ship should be indicated by the appropriate 
sound signals as prescribed in the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea (COLREGS) [53]. 
 
Fig.5.2 Improper management for ship operation, 1998-2008 
2. Poor repair condition on ship structure 
 Fig. 5.3 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as poor 
repairs condition on ship structure lead to engine failure, casualty and collision are cases 
reach highest number of maritime accidents. One of root cause is decreased of quality 
that less detailed checks, witnessing tests, measurements and trials where applicable of 
selected parts on the ship to identify corrosion, structural defects or damage to hull, 
machinery and /or piece of equipment which, based on the Society’s Rules and the 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
ca
se
s 
Kind of maritime accident 
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
39 
 
opinion of the surveyor remedial measures and/or appropriated recommendation 
condition of ship [54]. 
 
Fig.5.3 Poor repair condition on ship structure in 1998-2008 
3. Poor preparation for sea  
  Fig. 5.4 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as poor 
preparation for sea lead to operation inhibitor, stranding/grounding, collision and 
casualty are cases reach highest number of maritime accidents. One of root cause is 
decreased of knowing that the times of the tide and obtained up to date weather forecast 
(expected wind conditions) and checked the ship particularly steering and throttle 
controls, watertight hatches and drains. The vessel must be seaworthy, suitable for the 
conditions and able to take some impact from waves [55]. 
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Fig.5.4 Poor preparation for sea in 1998-2008 
4. Improper hydrographic survey before sailing 
 Fig. 5.5 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as 
improper hydrographic survey before sailing poor preparation for sea lead to 
stranding/grounding, facilities damage and collision are cases reach highest number of 
maritime accidents. One of root cause is decreased of quality that improving 
hydrographic surveys and monitoring made them more effective, and rationalize marine 
charts and sailing directions through measures such as producing them in electronic 
form. The work of a hydrographic survey technician can be broken down into four main 
job functions: conducting pre-cruise logistics and survey planning, conducting field 
operations, managing data, and maintaining equipment. Within each of these categories 
there are a series of varied tasks that must be performed. Particularly coastal sea areas 
where a high proportion of marine accidents occur and also both commercial vessels 
and pleasure boats frequently operate. Responding to the movement of making the 
installation of the electronic chart display unit mandatory, will work to publish 
electronic navigation charts for more areas [56]. 
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Fig.5.5 Hydrographic survey before sailing in 1998-2008 
5. Inadequate passage planning 
 Fig. 5.6 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as 
inadequate passage planning for ship`s lead to stranding/grounding, collision (single), 
facilities damage and casualty are cases reach highest number of maritime accidents. 
One of root caused is decrease of quality that knowledge and skills will affect to 
performance of the seaman. A seaman while selection and keeping ship's course that 
must be considered the time, discipline, money, appropriate technical knowledge and 
skills, support of equipment. Courses have not been selected to take advantage of 
weather and currents and most efficient routes. 
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Fig.5.6 Inadequate passage planning in 1998-2008 
6. Improper ship handling 
 Fig. 5.7 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as 
improperly ship handling lead to collision (single), collision (others), 
stranding/grounding, casualty are cases reach highest number of maritime accidents. 
One of root cause is decreased quality of knowledge that fundamental skill of 
professional seamanship is being able to maneuver a vessel with accuracy and precision. 
Unlike vehicles on land, a ship afloat is subject to the movements of the air around it 
and the water in which it floats. Another complicating factor is the mass of a ship that 
has to be accounted for when stopping and starting. 
 Ship handling in confined waters, particularly in narrow waterways, has been 
receiving a great deal of attention. In regard to maneuvering performance, shallow 
waters may be defined as those in which the ratio of water depth to ship draft is three or 
less. At greater ratios, shallow-water effects on maneuvering performance became 
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rapidly less significant as water deepens. Restricted water maybe defined as narrow 
channels or canals, waterways with vertical or overhanging banks or areas that include 
piers and breakwaters which introduce a substantial change in maneuvering 
characteristic or requirements. Obviously, more restricted waters include shallow water, 
and many include significant currents and tides. In restricted waters, areas available for 
navigation is limited [57]. Lack of adequate training and experience by officers. 
  
 
Fig.5.7 Improper ship handling in 1998-2008 
7. Unconfirmed ship`s position 
 Fig.5.8 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as 
unconfirmed ship`s position lead to collision, stranding/grounding and facilities damage 
are cases reach highest number of maritime accidents. One of root cause is decreased 
quality to identify ship or other ships because less to knowledge and skills that incorrect 
vessel heading, Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) and destination information, 
unfamiliar with Automatic Identification System (AIS) or other navigation equipment to 
other vessels equipment that provides information for the unit to transmit. In 
consequence that the double bottom area of the vessel will probably suffer considerable 
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damage, particularly if the ground is rocky. Keeping in mind the conditions of the 
neighboring sea area, the exact position of your ship shall be constantly checked and 
updated [58].  
 The outline of navigation, as commonly practiced in every sailing is sufficient 
to enable a person to conduct a ship from one port to another, or at least to show in plain 
simple terms the principle upon which it is done.  
 
Fig.5.8 Unconfirmed ship's position in 1998-2008 
8. Improper look-out 
 Fig.5.9 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as improper 
look-out lead to collision (single), collision (others), stranding/grounding are cases 
reach highest number of maritime accidents. One of root cause is indicated that 
improper look-out to effect collision due to rules. The international COLREGs define, 
under Rule 5, the criteria for keeping a proper look-out. Look-out is an important 
element of safe watch keeping, especially when the visibility is restricted and includes 
look-out by hearing, radar, VHF, AIS as well as by sight. There is no excuse for an 
improper look-out but there are frequently reasons: lack of support, low discipline, 
disinterest, carelessness, laziness to name but a few. These unsafe actions occurred in 
these collision accidents are considered as poor lookout: no look-out man is arranged at 
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proper position, particularly in restricted visibility conditions; the number of look-out 
men is not enough in prevailing circumstances; the duty of look-out is not properly 
conducted; all available means appropriate including the effect use of available 
instruments and equipment are not properly used; the situation is not fully appraised; 
anchor watch is not properly kept, Cockcroft ,A.,N et al. [59]. 
 Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing 
as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and 
conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision. 
Maintaining is a proper look- out to avoid accidents. 
 
Fig.5.9 Improper Look-out in 1998-2008 
9. Fatigue 
 Fig.5.10 shows number of cases probability that unsafe conditions such as 
fatigue lead to stranding as the most influenced between collision(single), sinking, 
casualty and equipment damage are cases reach highest number of maritime accidents. 
 One of root cause is controlled fatigue or snooze due to how the motion of the 
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ocean can affect one’s balance, coordination, response time, eyesight, hearing, reflexes, 
judgment and the ability to enjoy daily work. The combination of wind and waves can 
cause sea sickness, which will affect motor skills and one’s ability to think clearly. 
However, the main reasons are overwork, under-manning and non-adherence to the 
STCW Hours of Rest requirements. Operating a ship while fatigued is always a bad idea 
MAIB [60]. Good coordination to avoid maritime accidents.  
 
Fig.5.10 Fatigue 
10. Insufficient maintenance and wrong handling of steering systems and nautical 
instruments 
 Fig.5.11 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as 
insufficient maintenance and wrong handling of steering systems and nautical 
instruments lead to collision (single),collision(others) and stranding/grounding are the 
most influenced to maritime accidents. One of root caused is decreased quality attention 
to their vessel’s steering system, as long as it does the job without excess friction or play, 
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but vessels have age the systems need replacement. When installing is needed new 
steering, its good practice to replace a steering system with one of the same type as was 
originally installed on ship. This ensures that the ship will continue to handle as it was 
designed, and simplifies the installation process. 
 Repair parts for nautical instruments. These components must be replaced as 
units for safety and convenience since engine interfacing is standardized. Be sure to 
water-test in new system carefully as you become familiar with the changes in on ship’s 
maneuvering. 
 
Fig.5.11Maintenance and wrong handling of steering systems and nautical instruments 
in 1998-2008 
11. Poor attention to meteorological and oceanographically information 
 Fig.5.12 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as poor 
attention to meteorological and oceanographically information lead to collision 
(single),collision(others) and stranding/grounding are the most influenced to maritime 
accidents. One of root cause is decreased of quality attention to meteorological forecast 
and warning services in support of the safety of life and property at sea. For those who 
work at sea or live near the coast, forecasts of maritime weather and ocean conditions 
have as important as forecasts of weather in general. Rough seas, freak waves, storm 
surges and strong currents can make many marine activities difficult and dangerous. 
High waves and storm surges can lead to coastal flooding. Tropical cyclones and 
associated phenomena can be the most dangerous conditions encountered by seamen. 
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Changes in ocean temperature can affect the marine ecosystem, from plankton to 
fisheries and influence weather and climate. Understanding that monitoring, mapping 
and predicting maritime weather and ocean conditions for adequate planning of coastal 
zone and marine activities and to provide a structure for early detection and warning 
marine related hazards [61]. 
 
Fig.5.12 Poor attention to meteorological and oceanographical in 1998-2008 
12. Improper anchoring and mooring  
 Fig.5.13 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as 
improper anchoring and mooring lead to collision (others), stranding/grounding, distress 
are the most influenced to maritime accidents. One of root cause is decreased of quality 
that how to selected good anchorage and do not drag anchor [62], such as  
(1) The anchorage where the anchor holds well shall be selected by large-scale charts, 
and the dragging of anchor shall be prevented by two anchor mooring if necessary. 
(2) To discover dragging anchor early, the exact position of your ship shall be confirmed 
during anchorage, relevant. 
The position un-correct anchoring in tidal waters is vital to minimize than anchoring 
improperly accident on a ship.  
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Fig.5.13 Improper anchoring and mooring in 1998-2008 
13. Inadequate preparation for rough sea  
 Fig.5.14 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as 
inadequate preparation for rough sea lead to capsizing, distress and stranding /grounding 
are the most influenced to maritime accidents. One of root cause is decreased of quality 
that time is a critical factor for reacting in a situation like rough weather. Weather 
forecasts are common at sea these days and if not, then the experienced seafarer can read 
the natural signs of wind, swell, pressure and temperature to learn if bad weather and 
rough seas are coming. Thus, seafarers are usually well prepared in advance of bad 
weather. However, sudden deteriorations, or enormous waves (such as tsunami) can catch 
us all unawares and that is where good training comes into play. 
 It is very important for a seafarer to know what to do in rough weather situations 
so that mistakes can be avoided and within minimal time on the ship can be prepared for 
rough sea such as steering control, machinery control, and other common precautions. 
Handling of the ship depends on the training, knowledge, skills and teamwork of the 
ship’s staff. Continuous training to be able to prevent incidents for rough at sea will 
prevent the accidents.  
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Fig.5.14 Inadequate preparation for rough sea in 1998-2008 
14. No indication of navigation lights and shapes  
 Fig.5.15 shows number of cases probability that unsafe conditions such as No 
indication of navigation lights and shapes lead to collision (others) is the most 
influenced to maritime accidents.  
 Many root cause are referred that no light and shapes in rules follow 
1. All weather conditions, if any light are lost or extinguished they must be replaced or 
repaired as soon as possible. A delay in attending to light or shapes in severe weather 
conditions because of danger to personnel should be recorded in the official log book.   
2. No other light 
A vessel 100 meters or more in length is required to use the available working or 
equivalent light to illuminate her decks when at anchor by rule 30(c), and smaller vessel 
at anchor may sue such light. 
3. Restricted visibility 
The prescribed light, if carried must also be exhibited in restricted visibility from 
sunrise to sunset. The words if carried are included are not fitted with navigation lights 
as their operations are restricted to daylight hours.  
4. By day 
Shapes must be exhibited by day, not merely from sunrise to sunset. 
A vessel required to show a day signal should exhibit both light(s) and shapes(s) during 
the period of twilight [63]. 
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No indication of navigation lights and shapes because of a ship cannot suspend piloting 
operations are condition of darkness falls and daytime navigational aids no longer can 
be seen. The purposes of identification, lights have individual characteristics regarding 
color, intensity, and system of operation. For this reason, aids to navigation are lighted 
whenever it is necessary its application involve the exercise of special skills and fine 
techniques, which can be perfected only by experience and careful practice. Continuous 
training to be able to prevent frequently no indications of light and shapes will prevent 
the accidents.  
 
Fig.5.15 No indication of navigation lights and shapes in 1998-2008 
15. Signaling failure 
 Fig.5.16 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as 
signaling failure lead to collision (others), collision (single) and casualty are the most 
influenced to maritime accidents. One of root cause is referred that to lack of proper 
interpretation about maneuver by the relevant signals on the ship’s whistle. In or near an 
area of restricted visibility, signals shall be used by vessels in accordance with the 
following specifications such as a sailing vessel, a vessel engaged in fishing, a vessel 
not under command, a vessel restricted in her ability to maneuver, a vessel constrained 
by her draft (except a vessel being towed by another power-driven vessel) and a 
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power-driven vessel engaged in towing or pushing another vessel shall, when underway, 
sound at intervals of not more than 2 minutes one prolonged blast followed by two short 
blasts.  
 
Fig.5.16 Signaling failure in 1998-2008 
16. Improper ship's speed   
 Fig.5.17 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as 
improper ship's speed lead to collision (others), collision (single), stranding/grounding  
and casualty are the most influenced to maritime accidents. One of root cause is referred 
that every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper 
and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to 
the prevailing circumstances and conditions. In determining a safe speed the following 
factors shall be among those taken into account such as the state of visibility; in the 
traffic density including concentrations of fishing vessels or any other vessels; the 
maneuverability of the vessel with special reference to stopping distance and turning 
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ability in the prevailing conditions. Check speed on a ship taking into account the 
situation in and the situation moving towards. Excessive speed contributes to many 
collisions, P& I Club [64]. 
 
Fig.5.17 Improper ship's speed in 1998-2008 
17. Ignoring of International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 
(COLREGS)  
 Fig.5.18 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as not 
obeying of International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGs) 
lead to collision (others), collision (single), stranding/grounding are the most influenced 
to maritime accidents. One of root cause is referred that not obeying COLREGs can be 
put down to misinterpretation, even though the rules are quite clear. Keeping to reminds 
mariners of the basics of the COLREGs and that they must be kept well in mind and 
obeyed notwithstanding the profusion of equipment on the modern bridge. That 
equipment does not avoid collision. It is merely an aid to collision avoidance. What 
avoids collisions is compliance with the COLREGs. 
Ignorance on how to apply them in sea conditions, and plain, deliberate non-adherence 
when the situation may not be obviously understood, ensures that accidents, 
close-quarters situations then collisions will occur (see in fig. 5.18). 
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Fig.5.18 Ignoring of COLREG in 1998-2008 
18. Main engine failure  
 Fig.5.19 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as main 
engine failure lead to engine failure, flooding, operation inhibitor and fire are cases 
reach highest number of maritime accidents. One of the root cause are referred that lack 
of overhauling a cylinder, means lack of a routine periodical maintenance task on a 
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marine diesel engine to ensure that the components of that cylinder have not worn 
excessively and are fit to continue service. Management of preventative maintenance 
and inspection work is required to ensure that equipment is capable of operating as 
designed and to reduce the likelihood of failures in service. Equipment manufacturers 
recommend service intervals and procedures for their equipment. If these are not 
observed, equipment can fail without warning [65]. 
 
Fig.5.19 Main engine failures in 1998-2008 
19. Auxiliary engine failure 
 Fig. 5.20 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as 
auxiliary engine failure lead to operation inhibitor, fire and flooding are cases reach 
highest number of maritime accidents. One of root cause is decreased of quality that the 
first engine failure was troubleshooting marine auxiliary diesel engines (starting 
problems), the engine turns on air but does not run on fuel, choked fuel filters, during 
starting the safety valve blows, inadequate jacket water cooling, which led to the 
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cylinders overheating and seizure of the pistons. An incorrect setting of the jacket water 
temperature controller was identified. This was exacerbated by blockages in the jacket 
water coolers. Good maintenance and cleanliness procedures should be followed. 
Prevention can often avoid expensive breakdowns and dangerous situations arising [62]. 
 
Fig.5.20 Auxiliary engine failure in 1998-2008 
20. Poor management of lubricant oil  
 Fig. 5.21 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as poor 
management of lubricant oil lead to engine failure, operation inhibitor, fire, and 
equipment damage are cases reach highest number of maritime accidents. One of root 
cause is decreased quality that poor management of lubricant oil needed practices and 
procedures for ensuring that the standby lubricating oil filter was ready for service, for 
monitoring lubricating oil filter performance and for changing over to the standby filter 
were adequate [66]. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
ca
se
s 
Kind of maritime accident 
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
57 
 
 
Fig.5.21 Poor management of lubricant oil in 1998-2008 
21. Poor management of electrical equipment 
 Fig.5.22 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as poor 
management of electrical equipment lead to fire, operation inhibitor, engine failure and 
casualty are cases reach highest number of maritime accidents. One of root cause is 
poor management of electrical equipment that ship steering systems are commonly 
electro-hydraulic, with the ‘electro’ parts requiring continual good checking. 
Regulations exist to control the construction, installation, operation and maintenance of 
electrical equipment so that danger is eliminated as f.ar as possible. Minimum 
acceptable standards of safety are issued by various bodies including national 
governments, international governmental conventions (e.g. SOLAS), national and 
international standards associations (e.g. BS and IEC), learned societies (e.9. IEE), 
classification societies (e.g. Lloyds), etc. Where danger arises it is usually due to 
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accident, neglect or some other contravention of the regulations. Thus, preventive as 
well as corrective maintenance is required [67]. 
 
Fig.5.22 Management of electrical equipment in 1998-2008 
22. Improper handling and other task  
 Fig. 5.23 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as 
improper handling and other task lead to human casualty, capsizing, fire and sinking are 
cases reach highest number of maritime accidents. One of root cause is referred that 
largely a matter of common sense and is necessary for the care and protection of objects 
such as to know workplace equipment, a seaman need to be trained in the proper use 
and limitations of the equipment they operate. However, good handling techniques are 
not always obvious.  
 
Fig.5.23 Improper handling and other task in 1998-2008 
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23. Improper fishing work  
 Fig. 5.24 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as 
improper fishing work lead to casualty and capsizing are cases reach highest number of 
maritime accidents. One of root cause is decrease quality of practical understanding of 
the basic types of small fishing vessel is construction including common terminology. A 
fishing vessel encumbered by her nets or trawl cannot keep out of the way of other 
vessels and Rule 26 directs all other vessels to keep out of the way of fishing vessels. 
Conversely, it is the duty of encumbered fishing vessels to keep their course and speed. 
The rule as to indicating the position of the nets by a second light should be strictly 
observed.  
 
Fig.5.24 Improper fishing work in1998-2008 
24. Poor management of passenger and cargo loading  
 Fig. 5.25 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as 
improper fishing work lead to casualty and sinking are cases reach highest number of 
maritime accidents. One of root cause is decrease of quality that a common problem for 
ships and crews is the miss-declaration of shipping container weights and contents. It is 
of the utmost importance to recognize that actions taken when containers are stuffed 
may have direct implications for the stability and safety of containerships, the lives of 
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seafarers on board and the safety of others throughout the transport chain. It is vital to 
adhere to weight restrictions, and correct procedures for loading and securing cargo, to 
ensure the safe distribution of weight and that cargoes inside containers do not move or 
shift when at sea, compromising the safety of the ship. Un-stable position of the ship 
will be impacted to accident. The IMO/ILO have guideline on the Packing of Cargo 
Transport Units, provides a common global resource for information on container 
stuffing. 
 
Fig.5.25 Poor management of passenger and cargo loading in 1998-2008 
25. Inadequate supervision of working on board  
 Fig. 5.26 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as 
inadequate supervision of working on board lead to collision (others) and 
stranding/grounding referring to casualty are cases reach highest number of maritime 
accidents. One of root cause is decreased quality that inadequate supervision of work on 
board, where much equipment and systems are highly specialized, can lead to costly 
malfunctions. The vessel is only one element of a large project and a disciplined project 
management approach is required to ensure smooth dovetailing with the overall 
economics and design plan. Time or cost over runs can eliminate projected margins, 
making it critical that projects are completed on time with no compromise on cost or 
quality. Close supervision by qualified experts is therefore of critical importance, right 
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from a vessel's inception on the drawing board, through its sea trials to final delivery 
and continue monitoring during of sailing by giving a certain period of time. Inadequate 
supervision will get many problems.  
 
           Fig.5.26 Inadequate supervision of working on board in1998-2008 
26. Inadequate report taking over watch  
 Fig. 5.27 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as 
Inadequate report and taking over watch lead to collision (others), collision (single), 
stranding/grounding and casualty are cases reach highest number of maritime accidents. 
One of root cause is decreased quality that inadequate seamen on taking over the watch 
the relieving officer should satisfy  himself as to the vessel estimated or true position 
and confirm its intended track, course and speed and should note any dangers to 
navigation expected to be encountered during his watch [68]. The seamen are unable to 
exclude the possibility of the officer of the navigational watch being affected by fatigue 
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caused by an excessive workload due to a watch system which is inadmissible for a 
vessel of this size and area of operation as well as the course of the voyage.  
 
Fig.5.27 Inadequate report and taking over watch 
27. Poor management fire  
 Fig. 5.28 shows number of cases probability that unsafe actions such as poor 
management fire lead to fire and explosion are cases reach highest number of maritime 
accidents. One of reason is decreased quality that management to prevent fire on ship is 
discovery of a fire at sea can expect to be rapidly followed by the sounding of the fire 
alarm. This would alert personnel to move towards their respective fire stations, 
inclusive of the Navigation Bridge and the Engine Room. Each scenario will be 
influenced by various factors, not least the nature of the fire, and what is actually 
burning. In the event of an engine room fire, where the total flood CO2 employed, while 
the ship will immediately become a ‘dead ship’. Such as situation of fire lead to 
explosion would invariably leave the vessel at the mercy of the weather conditions (see 
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in fig.5.28). This situation may dictate need to engage with an ocean-going tug at a later 
time, once the fire is out [69] 
 
Fig.5.28 Poor management fire in 1998-2008 
28. Force Majeure 
 Fig. 5.29 shows number of cases probability that unsafe condition such as force 
majeure lead to capsizing, distress, engine failure, casualty are cases reach highest 
number of maritime accidents. One of reason is force majeure sometimes called others 
forces and external forces. Generally its unsafe conditions is which have externality, 
un-predictability. The reason unpredictable situation will occur as where 
non-performance is caused by the usual and natural consequences of external forces, 
describes in the fig. 5.29. 
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Fig.5.29 Force Majeure in 1998-2008 
29. Others 
 
Fig.5.30 Others in 1998-2008 
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5.4 Risk Level Term in Safety Standard 
 Generally, any unsafe actions are contains a risk. A risk is a consequence that 
will happen. Further definition of risk is mentioned by R. de la Campa Portela [70] in 
table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Definition of risk 
Definition of risk Author/Organization Year 
A combination of hazard level and (1) likelihood of 
the hazard leading to an accident and (2) hazard 
exposure or duration. 
Nancy Leveson, 
Massachusetts, US.  
1995 
A function of the probability of a hazard developing 
into an accident and the expected consequence of the 
accident if it did occur. 
Redmill and Rajan, UK   1997 
The risk remaining after protective measures have 
been taken is the residual risk. 
ISO/IEC Guide 51; 
Geneva, Switzerland. 
1999 
Combination of the probability of occurrences of 
harm and the severity of that harm. 
ISO/IEC Guide 51; 
Geneva, Switzerland. 
1999 
The probable consequence of that outcome.  
Robert O’Connor, New 
York, US. 
2000 
A combination of the probability of occurrence of 
harm and the severity of that harm. 
IEC 61508-4 is an 
International standard 
of rules applied in 
industry; 
2002 
Risk is a combination of the frequency of occurrence 
of harm and the severity of that harm 
IEC 61511-1; 2003 
The effect of uncertainty on objectives. 
ISO 31000;   
ISO Guide 73; 
2009 
 
5.4.1 Risk Level Determination 
 The level tolerance of any consequence from every case is going to happen, 
different. As it is well known, risk level which give idea of the general importance of a 
specific hazard, can be comprised amongst one of three assumptions Kuo [71]: 
A. Intolerable risk level: the risk level is too high to be justified and that it should be 
reduced regardless of the costs associated with the measures needed to bring the risk 
down to a tolerable level. 
B. Tolerable risk level: risk levels that are assessed to be below the intolerable limit are 
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regarded as tolerable provided it can be demonstrated to be ALARP (As Low As 
Reasonable Practicable). In order to demonstrate that the risk level is ALARP, cost 
effectiveness assessment of available risk control options must be performed. If cost 
effective risk control options are available, the risk level will not be ALARP and thus 
not regarded as tolerable until these are implemented. 
C. Negligible risk level: the risk level is assessed to be so low that no further risk 
reduction measures are required. 
 Campa Portela was corrected in probability level. In this case, to determine the 
risk level of the studied factor implement to use in a risk matrix, which parameters have 
probability of happening of such a factor in a maritime accident and its consequences, 
both data derived from the analysis done in step 1. To elaborate the risk matrix, that can 
be seen in fig. 1.1 and 1.2, will be processed to establish five levels of probability and 
five levels of consequences in table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Probability levels of risk 
Over    Under Description 
0 %  –  10 % very low probability risk level 
10 %  -  40 % low probability risk level 
40 %  -  60 % half probability risk level 
60 %  -  90 % high probability risk level 
90 % -  100 % very high probability risk level 
Consequence levels could be established as: 
1. Disastrous consequences: people death, very serious damage to maritime, 
environment, sinking or any other accident which results in the ship total lost. 
2. Serious consequences: people serious injuries, maritime environment serious damage, 
fire, collision, grounding or any other accident which results in very serious damage to 
ship structure. 
3. Moderate consequences: moderate injuries to people, moderate damage to maritime 
environment or any other accident which results in moderate damage to ship structure. 
4. Minor consequences: minor injuries to people, minor damage to maritime 
environment, or any other accident which results in minor damage to ship structure. 
5. Negligible consequences: very little damage to ship structure (see in table 5.4). 
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Table 5.4 Risk matrix 
Consequences 
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous Probability 
Over Under 
0-10 % Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable 
10-40 % Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable 
40-60 % Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable 
60-90 % Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable 
90-100 % Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable 
 
5.4.2 Unsafe Actions in Risk Matrix  
 Based on the results of data collection has been described by table 5.1 in 
section 5.2, and the risk assessment and investigation which has been described, the risk 
level analysis for unsafe actions follows below: 
1. Improper management for ship operation(X1) = 1.5 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as improper management for ship operation have minor, 
moderate, serious, disastrous consequences and negligible and tolerable risk level. It 
means the risk level is assessed to be so low but need assessed to be ALARP (As Low 
As Reasonable Practicable) risk reduction measures too that no further risk reduction 
measures are required based on 1.5 % is very low probability of risk level (table 5.5) 
and fig.5.2 are number of cases serious tolerable . Considering is needed awareness (as 
explained sub chapter 4.2.2) as greatest accidents to casualty or injured in operational. 
Other kind of maritime accidents such as engine failure and collision as result to risk.. 
Table 5.5 Improper management for ship operation=1.5 % in risk matrix 
 
2. Poor repair condition on ship structure(X2) = 0.9 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as poor repair condition on ship structure have minor, 
moderate consequences and negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to 
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Probability
Consequences
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous
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be so low that no further risk reduction measures are required based on 0.9 % is very 
low probability of risk level (table 5.6) and fig.5.3 are number of cases serious tolerable. 
Monitoring is needed in procedure maintenance (as explained sub chapter 4.2.2) 
because greatest accidents lead to engine failure in operational. Other kind of maritime 
accidents such as casualty and collision are highest accidents will be occurred to risk. 
Table 5.6 Poor repair condition on ship structure =0.9 % in risk matrix 
 
3. Poor preparation for sea(X3) = 0.5 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as poor preparation for sea have minor, moderate 
consequences and negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be so low 
that no further risk reduction measures are required based on 0.5 % is very low 
probability of risk level (table 5.7) and fig.5.4 are number of cases serious tolerable. 
Monitoring is needed in procedure (as explained sub chapter 4.2.2) because greatest 
accidents lead to operation inhibitor during operational. Other kind of maritime 
accidents such as stranding/grounding, collision and casualty can be occurred to risk. 
Table 5.7 Poor preparation for sea = 0.5% in risk matrix 
 
4. Improper hydrographic survey (X4) = 2.4 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as improper hydrographic survey is have moderate 
consequences and negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be so low 
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Consequences
Probability Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Consequences
Probability Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous
69 
 
that no further risk reduction measures are required based on 2.4 % is very low 
probability of risk level (table 5.8) and fig.5.5 are number of cases serious tolerable. 
Reasoning is needed action (as explained sub chapter 4.2.2) that procedure to improve 
hydrographic surveys and monitoring because greatest accidents lead to 
stranding/grounding in operational. Other kind of maritime accidents such as facilities 
damage and collision are two highest numbers of cases to risk.  
Table 5.8 Improper hydrographic survey = 2.4 % in risk matrix 
 
5. Inadequate passage planning for ship's (X5) = 2.2 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as inadequate passage planning for ship's have minor, 
moderate consequences and negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to 
be so low that no further risk reduction measures are required based on 2.2 % is very 
low probability of risk level (table 5.9) and fig.5.6 are number of cases serious tolerable. 
Considering is needed action (as explained sub chapter 4.2.2) that procedure knowledge 
and skills will affect to performance of the seaman because greatest accidents lead to 
stranding/grounding in operational. Other kind of maritime accidents such as facilities 
damage and casualty are cases reach highest to risk.  
Table 5.9 Inadequate passage planning for ship's = 2.2 % in risk matrix 
 
 
 
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Serious DisastrousNegligible Minor Moderate
Consequences
Probability
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Consequences
Probability Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous
70 
 
6. Improper ship handling(X6) = 2.8 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as improperly ship handling have minor, moderate 
consequences and negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be so low 
that no further risk reduction measures are required based on 2.8 % is very low 
probability of risk level (table 5.10) and fig.5.7 are number of cases serious tolerable. 
Controlling is needed action (see in sub chapter 4.2.3) for training about fundamental 
skill of professional seamen ship is being able to maneuver vessel with accuracy and 
precision because greatest accidents lead to collision. Other kind of maritime accidents 
such as facilities damage and casualty are cases reach highest to risk.  
Table 5.10.Improper ship handling = 2.8 % in risk matrix 
 
7. Unconfirmed ship position (X7) = 4.2 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as unconfirmed ship position have moderate consequences 
and negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be so low that no further 
risk reduction measures are required based on 4.2 % is very low probability of risk level 
(table 5.11) and fig.5.8 are number of cases serious tolerable. Controlling is needed 
action (as explained sub chapter 4.2.3) training about less to knowledge and skills about 
incorrect vessel heading because greatest accidents lead to collisions. Other kind of 
maritime accidents such as stranding/grounding and facilities damage are cases reach 
highest to risk. 
Table 5.11 Unconfirmed ship position = 4.2 % in risk matrix 
 
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Consequences
Probability Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous
Consequences
Probability
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8. Improper look-out (X8) = 31.1 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as improper look-out have moderate consequences and 
tolerable risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be ALARP (As Low As 
Reasonable Practicable) risk reduction measures are required based on 31.1 % is cost 
effectiveness assessment of available risk control options must be performed (table 
5.12) and fig.5.9 are number of cases serious tolerable. Monitoring is needed to control 
behavior attitude (as explained sub chapter 4.2.2) implemented rules of International 
COLREGs because greatest accidents lead to collision. Other kind of maritime 
accidents such as casualty and facilities damage are cases reach highest to risk. 
Table 5.12 Improper look- out = 31.1 % in risk matrix 
 
9. Fatigue (X9) = 6.5 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe conditions such as fatigue have moderate consequences and negligible 
risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be so low that no further risk reduction 
measures are required based on 6.5 % is very low probability of risk level (table 5.13) 
and fig.5.10 are number of cases serious tolerable. Monitoring is needed good 
coordination due to how the motion of the ocean can affect one’s balance, coordination 
because greatest accidents lead to stranding/grounding. Other kind of maritime 
accidents such as collision (others) and collision (single) are cases reach highest to risk. 
Table 5.13.Fatigue = 6.5 % in risk matrix 
 
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Serious DisastrousNegligible Minor ModerateProbability
Consequences
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious DisastrousProbability
Consequences
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10. Insufficient maintenance and wrong handling of steering systems and nautical 
instruments(X10) =0.2 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as insufficient maintenance and wrong handling of steering 
systems and nautical instruments have moderate consequences and negligible risk level. 
It means the risk level is assessed to be so low that no further risk reduction measures 
are required based on 0.2 % is very low probability of risk level (table 5.14) and fig.5.11 
is number of cases serious tolerable. Monitoring is needed awareness (as explained sub 
chapter 4.2.2) that maintenance operation because greatest accidents lead to collision 
(single), collision (others) and stranding/grounding  
Table 5.14 Insufficient maintenance and wrong handling of steering systems and 
nautical instruments =0.2 % in risk matrix 
 
11. Poor attention to meteorological and oceanographical (X11) = 2.1 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as poor attention have moderate consequences and 
negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be so low that no further risk 
reduction measures are required based on 2.1 % is very low probability of risk level 
(table 5.15) and explained in fig.5.12 are number of cases serious tolerable. Considering 
is needed monitoring and controlling (as explained sub chapter 4.2.2) that maritime 
weather and ocean conditions for adequate planning of marine activities because 
greatest accidents lead to capsizing, stranding, collision (single), distress.  
Table 5.15 Poor attention to meteorology and oceanography = 2.1% in risk matrix 
 
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous
Consequences
Probability
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous
Consequences
Probability
73 
 
12. Improper anchoring and mooring (X12)= 1.1 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as improper anchoring and mooring have moderate 
consequences and negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be so low 
that no further risk reduction measures are required based on 1.1 % is very low 
probability of risk level (table 5.16) and fig.5.13 are number of cases serious tolerable. 
Monitoring is needed good coordination due to how to selected good anchor and do not 
drag anchor in operational because greatest accidents lead to collision (others). Other 
kind of maritime accidents such as stranding/grounding and distress are the most 
influence to risk. 
Table 5.16 Improper anchoring and mooring = 1.1 % in risk matrix 
 
13. Inadequate preparation for rough at sea (X13) = 0.8 % in matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as inadequate preparation for rough at sea have moderate 
consequences and negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be so low 
that no further risk reduction measures are required based on 0.8 % is very low 
probability of risk level (table 5.17) and fig.5.14 are number of cases serious tolerable. 
Monitoring and controlling are needed good coordination due to how to do in rough 
weather situations within limited time because greatest accidents lead to capsizing. 
Distress and stranding /grounding are the most influence to risk.  
Table 5.17 Inadequate preparation for rough at sea = 0.8 % in matrix 
 
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious DisastrousProbability
Consequences
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious DisastrousProbability
Consequences
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
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14. No indication of navigation lights and shapes (X14) = 1.2 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as no indication of navigation light have serious 
consequences and tolerable risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be ALARP 
(As Low As Reasonable Practicable) risk reduction measures are required based on 
1.2 % is cost effectiveness assessment of available risk control options must be 
performed (table 5.18) and fig.5.15 are number of cases serious tolerable. Monitoring is 
needed awareness (as explained sub chapter 4.2.2) that maintenance operation because 
greatest accidents lead to collision (single). Other kind of maritime accidents such as 
collision (others) are the most influence to risk. 
Table 5.18 No indication of navigation lights and shapes = 1.2 % in risk matrix 
 
15. Signaling failure (X15) =5.9 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as signaling failure have moderate consequences and 
negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be so low that no further risk 
reduction measures are required based on 5.9 % is very low probability of risk level 
(table 5.19) and fig.5.16 are number of cases serious tolerable. Monitoring is needed 
awareness (as explained sub chapter 4.2.2) that failures are interpreted the signal 
because the greatest accident lead to collision (others). Other kind of maritime accidents 
such as collision (single) and casualty as result to risk. 
Table 5.19 Signaling failure =5.9 % in risk matrix 
 
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious DisastrousProbability
Consequences
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious DisastrousProbability
Consequences
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
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16. Improper ship's speed (X16) =2.5 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as improper ship's speed have minor, moderate 
consequences and negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be so low 
that no further risk reduction measures are required based on 2.5 % is very low 
probability of risk level (in table 5.20) and explained in fig.5.17 are number of cases 
serious tolerable. Considering is needed controlling and monitoring (see in sub chapter 
4.2.2) that check speed on a ship taking into account the situation in and situation 
moving towards because the greatest accident lead to collision (others). Other kind of 
maritime accidents such as collision (single) and casualty as result to risk. 
Table 5.20 Improper ship's speed =2.5 % in risk matrix 
 
17. Ignoring COLREGS (X17) =11.0 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as no obeying COLREG have serious consequences and 
tolerable risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be ALARP (As Low As 
Reasonable Practicable) risk reduction measures are required based on 11.0 % is cost 
effectiveness assessment of available risk control options must be performed (table 
5.21) and fig.5.18 are number of cases serious tolerable. Considering is needed action 
(see in sub chapter 4.2.2) that keep remind mariners of the basic of COLREGs because 
greatest accidents lead to collision (others).  
Table 5.21 Ignoring COLREGS =11.0% in risk matrix 
 
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious DisastrousProbability
Consequences
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous
Consequences
Probability
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18. Main engine failure (X18) = 4.3 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as main engine failure have moderate consequences and 
negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be so low that no further risk 
reduction measures are required based on 4.3 % is very low probability of risk level 
(table 5.22) and fig.5.19 are number of cases serious tolerable. Considering is needed 
controlling periodical (as explained sub chapter 4.2.2) in maintenance because greatest 
accidents lead to engine failure. Other kind of maritime accidents such as flooding and 
operation inhibitor, fire as result to risk.  
Table 5.22.Main engine failure = 4.3 % in risk matrix 
 
19. Auxiliary engine failure (X19) = 2.1 % in risk matrix  
 Unsafe actions such as main engine failure have moderate consequences and 
negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be so low that no further risk 
reduction measures are required based on 2.1 % is very low probability of risk level 
(table 5.23) and fig.5.20 are number of cases serious tolerable. Considering is needed 
controlling periodical (as explained sub chapter 4.2.2) that maintenance and cleanliness 
procedures because greatest accidents lead to damage to engine failure. Other kind of 
maritime accidents such as operation inhibitor, fire as result to risk.  
Table 5.23 Auxiliary engine failure =2.1 % in risk matrix 
 
 
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous
Consequences
Probability
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious DisastrousProbability
Consequences
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20. Poor management of lubricant oil (X20) = 2.5 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as poor management of lubricant oil have moderate 
consequences and negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be so low 
that no further risk reduction measures are required based on 2.5 % is very low 
probability of risk level (in table 5.24) and explained in fig.5.21 are number of cases 
serious tolerable. Considering is needed monitoring (as explained sub chapter 4.2.2) 
periodical in lubricant oil and cleanliness procedures because greatest accidents lead to 
damage to engine failure. Other kind of maritime accidents such as operation inhibitor, 
fire and equipment damage are result probability of risk. 
Table 5.24 Poor management of lubricant oil =2.5 % in risk matrix 
 
21. Poor management of electrical equipment (X21) = 0.8 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as poor management of electrical equipment have minor, 
moderate consequences and negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to 
be so low that no further risk reduction measures are required based on 0.8 % is very 
low probability of risk level (table 5.25) and fig.5.22 are number of cases serious 
tolerable. Considering is monitoring (see in sub chapter 4.2.2) that continual good 
checking, testing and maintenance as indeed do all electrical systems on board a ship. 
Other kind of maritime accidents such as fire, operation inhibitor, engine failure and 
casualty are result probability of risk. 
Table 5.25 Poor management of electrical equipment = 0.8 % in risk matrix 
 
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious DisastrousProbability
Consequences
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous
Consequences
Probability
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22. Improper handling and other task(X22) = 1.8 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as improper handling and other task have minor, moderate, 
serious, disastrous consequences and negligible and tolerable risk level. It means the 
risk level is assessed to be ALARP (As Low As Reasonable Practicable) risk reduction 
measures are required based on 1.8 % is cost effectiveness assessment of available risk 
control options must be performed (table 5.26) and fig.5.23 are number of cases serious 
tolerable. Considering is awareness (as shown sub chapter 4.2.2) that continual good 
handling techniques not always obvious because improper handling as a matter of 
common sense and necessary for the care and protection of objects and fatality greatest 
led to disastrous such human casualty, capsizing, fire and sinking.  
Table 5.26 Improper handling and other task = 1.8 % in risk matrix 
 
23. Improper fishing work (X23) = 0.9 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as improper handling and other task have minor, moderate, 
serious, disastrous consequences and negligible and tolerable risk level. It means the 
risk level is assessed to be ALARP (As Low As Reasonable Practicable) risk reduction 
measures are required based on 0.9 % is cost effectiveness assessment of available risk 
control options must be performed (table 5.27) and fig.5.24 are number of cases serious 
tolerable. Considering is attitude and action (as shown sub chapter 4.2.2) that the rule as 
to indicating the position of the nets by a second light should be strictly observed to 
avoid fatality led to disastrous such human casualty and capsizing. 
Table 5.27 Improper fishing work = 0.9 % in risk matrix 
 
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous
Consequences
Probability
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous
Consequences
Probability
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24. Poor management of passenger and cargo loading(X24) = 0.6 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as poor management of passenger and cargo loading have 
minor, moderate, serious, disastrous consequences and negligible and tolerable risk 
level. It means the risk level is assessed to be ALARP (As Low As Reasonable 
Practicable) risk reduction measures are required based on 0.6 % is cost effectiveness 
assessment of available risk control options must be performed (table 5.28) and fig.5.25 
are number of cases serious tolerable. Considering is attitude and action (as shown sub 
chapter 4.2.2) that to recognize that actions taken when containers are stuffed may have 
direct implications for the stability and safety of containerships, the lives of seafarers on 
board and the safety of others throughout the transport chain to avoid fatality greatest 
led to disastrous such human casualty and sinking as result to risk. 
Table 5.28 Poor management of passenger and cargo loading =0.6 % in risk matrix 
 
25. Inadequate supervision of working on board (X25) = 6.5 % in risk matrix  
 Unsafe actions such as supervision of working on board have minor, moderate 
consequences and negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be so low 
that no further risk reduction measures are required based on 6.5 % is very low 
probability of risk level (table 5.29) and fig.5.26 are number of cases serious tolerable. 
Considering is controlling/monitoring (as explained sub chapter 4.2.2) during of sailing 
by giving a certain period of time because will be greatest led to collision (others) and 
stranding/grounding referring to casualty. 
Table 5.29 Inadequate supervision of working on board= 6.5% in risk matrix 
 
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious DisastrousProbability
Consequences
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious DisastrousProbability
Consequences
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
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26. Inadequate report and taking over watch on board (X26) = 2.4 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as supervision of working on board have minor, moderate 
consequences and negligible risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be so low 
that no further risk reduction measures are required based on 2.4 % is very low 
probability of risk level (table 5.30) and fig.5.27 are number of cases serious tolerable. 
Considering is controlling (as explained sub chapter 4.2.2) in to arrange and manage 
operational on ship because the greatest accident lead to collision (others). Other kind of 
maritime accidents such as collision (single), stranding/grounding and casualty are 
result probability of risk.  
Table 5.30 Inadequate report and taking over watch on board = 2.4 % in risk matrix 
 
27. Poor management fire (X27) = 0.5 % in risk matrix 
 Unsafe actions such as poor management fire have serious consequences and 
tolerable risk level. It means the risk level is assessed to be ALARP (As Low As 
Reasonable Practicable) risk reduction measures are required based on 0.5 % is cost 
effectiveness assessment of available risk control options must be performed (table 
5.31) and fig.5.28 are number of cases serious tolerable. Considering is attitude (see in 
sub chapter 4.2.2) that to prevent fire on ship and to expect to be rapidly dictate need to 
engage with an ocean-going tug at a later time, once the fire is out because the greatest 
accident lead to fire and explosion. 
Table 5.31.Risk level poor management on fire = 0.5 % in risk matrix  
 
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious DisastrousProbability
Consequences
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable90-100 %
Consequences
0-10 %
10-40 %
Probability
40-60 %
60-90 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous
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28. Force majeure (X28) = 0.1 % in risk matrix 
 Force majeure sometimes called others forces and external forces. Generally its 
unsafe conditions is which have externality, un-predictability. The reason unpredictable 
situations have minor, moderate and serious consequences and negligible risk level. It 
means the risk level is assessed to be so low that no further risk reduction measures are 
required based on 0.1 % is very low probability of risk level (table 5.32) and fig.5.29 
are number of cases serious tolerable. Considering is controlling/monitoring (as 
explained in sub chapter 4.2.2) that unpredictable situation will occur as where 
non-performance is caused by the usual and natural consequences of external forces, 
because the greatest accident lead to distress, engine failure, capsizing and casualty. 
Table 5.32 Force majeure = 0.1 % in risk matrix 
 
29. Others(X29) = 0.8 % in risk matrix 
 The reason unpredictable situations have minor, moderate and serious, 
disastrous consequences and negligible and tolerable risk level. Monitoring is condition 
in awareness, action, attitudes for control behavior (as explained sub chapter 4.2.2) that 
unpredictable situation should be strictly observed to avoid fatality greatest led to 
disastrous such human casualty, fire and capsizing, collisions (other) are probability of 
risk. 
Table 5.33 Others = 0.8 % in risk matrix 
 
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious Disastrous
Consequences
Probability
Over Under
Negligible Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable
Negligible Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Negligible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Tolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
0-10 %
10-40 %
40-60 %
60-90 %
90-100 %
Negligible Minor Moderate Serious DisastrousProbability
Consequences
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From the analysis of the risk level determination unsafe actions, found that: 
1. Any unsafe actions have different characteristics that lead to kind maritime accidents. 
2. Result problems that risk report by consequences level have consist of (Appendix-D): 
a. Minor-Moderate-Serious-Disastrous is five unsafe actions such as improper 
management for ship operation (X1), improper fishing work (X23), poor 
management of passenger and cargo loading (X24).  
b. Minor-Moderate-Serious such as poor repair condition on ship structure (X2),poor 
preparation for sea (X3), inadequate passage planning (X5), improper ship 
handling(X6),improper ship speed (X16), poor management and electrical 
equipment(X21), inadequate report and taking over watch (X26), force 
majeure(X28). 
c. Moderate-Serious such as improper hydrographic survey before sailing (X4), 
unconfirmed ship position (X7), improper look-out (X8), fatigue (X9), insufficient 
maintenance and wrong handling of steering systems and nautical instruments 
(X10), poor attention to meteorological and oceanography, improper anchoring and 
mooring (X12), inadequate preparation for rough sea (X13), ignoring COLREGS 
(X17), main engine failure(18), auxiliary engine failure (X19), poor management of 
lubricant oil (X20), inadequate supervision of working on board(X25). 
d. Serious such as no indication of navigation light and shapes (X14), poor 
management fire (X27). 
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CHAPTER 6 
LOGIC OF PATTERNS IN RESPONSE TO UNSAFE ACTIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 In chapter 3 is described that Safety Response Model (SRM), of which one 
important element is decision making. Decision making can be regarded as the 
cognitive process resulting in the selection of a course of action among several 
alternative scenarios. The start of every decision is making a procedure for the final 
choice output and that depends on the time limit and information as pointed out 
Maritime Coast Guard Agency (MCA) [73]. The output can be an action or an opinion 
of choice. The seafarer can make more efficient decisions by shaping performance from 
response to unsafe conditions or unsafe actions through analysis scenario in an event. 
When actions are as a choice with time in the background, ubiquitous and often 
inconspicuous properties both, physical and psychological appear (described by red line 
in fig. 5.1). Scheduling to shape response decisions should be modeled on input, process 
and output. However, although processes necessarily unfold in time, this is not of itself 
a property of primary scientific interest. Identification of shaping factors in the 
taxonomy of errors on each individual, such as the seafarer, can be aimed at minimizing 
human injuries, from minor to fatal, that could be created in the formation of a safety 
culture. The name of this method is Personal Identification (PIN) Safe. Regarding this 
method it was described in chapter 4 and more detail implemented in the following sub 
chapter 6.  
 
Making  Decisions
1.Sense of Decisions
1. Complete Information 2.Culture
Definition:
1. Distinguish and 
understand
2.Comprehensive criteria
1. Culture background
2. Culture organization
     (time and information)
Decision 
Makers
Mental 
Filter
3.Person
Time to action
(Training and Experience)
i  t  ti
( r i i   ri )
2.Quality Decisions
1.Situational Awarness
(Perception,Comprehension,Projec
tion)
2. Situational Familiarity
4.Products
1.The panel
2. Behaviour 
rule of Book
Inputt Outputt tProcess
 
 
Fig.6.1 Decision-making scheme 
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6.2 Quality Decisions Scheme Human Element in Maritime Transport Systems 
 The maritime transport system is a very complex and large-scale 
socio-technical environment system consisting of human actions that interact with each 
other and operate in a physical environment. The main elements of the system are 
objects of transport, infrastructure, and facilities; these are linked by an information 
system and transport-related activities Zhejiang,L.[74].The human element is very 
important it designs, develops, builds, operates, manages, regulates, and interacts with 
other elements of the system. These elements are embedded in very complex, 
interdependent, and dynamic relationships have been modified (as show in fig.6.2).  
 
G
O
A
L
Operator Control
Ship 
motion
Achieve 
Goal
Psychological 
Factor
Physical 
Disturbance
Limitations Environment
Position,State,Speed
Physiological 
Factor
 
Fig.6.2 Relationships amongst operator, environment and ship 
 Knowledge of the working environment is vital in order to decrease the risk 
value of an individual ship. Every risk will culminate in an accident. Considering it has 
the probability accident which the ship determined by time, location and information 
Decreasing the steps to reach of accident level, the author is using the fact that every 
accident has probability for an individual ship, which fact is determined using exposures 
and a casualty rate. The exposures are the number of potential casualty sensitive 
situations in which the ship can be involved that could lead to an accident. For example, 
the exposure of collisions is an encounter between two ships. By relating these 
exposures with the actual casualties from the accident database, the casualty rates for 
the different accident types are derived. When observing boating accidents, the failure 
probabilities are distinguished from the corresponding exposure, as has been explained 
in chapter 4. Any exposure has its own characteristics of accident. 
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6.3 Characteristics in Every Perception 
 One alternative approach is to study unconscious perception based on the 
relative sensitivity of direct and indirect measures to conscious perceptual information. 
By considering the relative sensitivity of direct and indirect to conscious perceptual 
information, it is possible to use the disassociation paradigm to study unconscious 
perception and to make only one a priori assumption. Obviously it is desirable to 
minimize a priori assumptions, and we propose that only the following reasonable, but 
minimal working assumption is required by the logic of paradigm as logic of pattern. 
 
6.3.1 Logic of Patterns in Qualitative Method  
 Critical events are consequences that potentially lead to accidents. Every 
accident that occurs during interaction with the human element will have its own 
characteristics. These characteristics need to be determined for evaluation by 
management. Identifying and analyzing the consequences are important to establishing 
evaluation strategies. Analyzing combinations of individual protection, management 
protection, structural calculations, and system damage, and their effects on safety 
culture can provide opportunities to enhance safety at sea. Some researchers have 
studied and many qualitative models have been used to analyze the risks of accidents or 
incidents, such as Bayesian models of plan recognition Charniak,R.,P.,G [75], 
taxonomy reliability Ross et al. [76], and risk based approaches in CREAM by 
Marseguerra et al.[77]. 
 Finite model theory by Istiarto [78] with sample S gives the group a real 
number with a value of 0–1 that is called weighting or probability; this allows the odds 
of the occurrence of an event to be calculated. 
 Each sample point in the sample universe is given a value denoting its probability; 
the sum of all probabilities for all sample points is equal to 1. 
 To calculate the odds for event A, all the events that make up sample A are added 
together. A is the number of these probabilities, which is denoted by P(A). Thus, 
the probability set ∅ is 0, and S is 1.  
  0 ≤ P(A) ≤ 1      (6.1)  
  P(∅) = 0       (6.2)  
  P(S) = 1       (6.3) 
 When an experiment has N different experimental results, each has the same 
possibility of occurrence, and n is all of the results of this experiment that contain 
event A, the probability of event A is  
  P(A) = 𝑛⁄𝑁      (6.4)  
The next step of the compound set events is as follows: 
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 The compound set events are for a combination of two events. If A and B are two 
sets in a universe or sample S, then the union of A and B is a new set that consists 
of members of A and B (as shows in equation 6.5): 
  A∪B = {x ϵ S │ x ϵ A or x ϵ B}    (6.5) 
Venn Diagram 
 
 
 
     
 
 
Fig. 6.3 Venn diagram of compound sets 
 
6.3.2 Behavior of Condition Response 
 Conditioning response is a behavior of the body to process occurrences due to 
the effect of some antecedent stimulus or agent in condition at a system. Information 
system in memory will be processed depending on situation of body. Everybody has a 
different perception in that condition or situation. Generally, a dynamic situation 
becomes quite difficult for making decisions and taking action. Analyzing the subject 
matter will be helped comprehensively when investigating uses classification system or 
taxonomy as a way of organizing performance. The taxonomies that emphasize 
observable behaviors are primarily of practical value. The taxonomy error by the UK P 
& I Club, has been modified. In fig. 6.4 is demonstrated various schemes for classifying 
error based on stages of information processing.  
A B S  
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Violations Mistakes Lapses Slips
4. Wrong actions:   due to habitual 
deviations from recommended 
practice.
1. Control failure: Due to 
unexpected situation  unintended 
situations under the dynamic  
conditions.
2. Omission or repetition: 
because of planned or unplanned 
action some required actions are 
not perforemed.  
3. Reversal: due to change in nature of 
task or change in task environment or 
reversal of the required sequence.
5. Wrong object:   because of 
situational violations not 
specifically covered in the 
procedures with actions Are 
performed  on an object that is not 
required.  
6. Too fast
7. Too slow 
8. Too early
: because of  time constraints or 
emotional pressure, actions are 
performed  quicker/slowler than 
required.
9. Too little
10. Too much: because of insufficient 
knowledge or experience more than 
required effort is exerted.
11. Wrong input: because of 
knowledge-related mistakes, data or  
digit other than those  required are  
entered.
12. Miscalibration: because of mistakes 
with regard to the rules,  wrong 
calibration is performed on the 
instrumentation and control equipment/
device.
13. Unclear: because of unintended 
actions for equipment/device so error 
mode for event under analysis is not 
clear.
Intended Actions Unintended Actions
Basic Error types
Human Error
Fig.6.4 Modified taxonomy error modes from cognitive functions 
  Analyzing information processing is identified which involves the use of rules. 
These rules may have been learned as a result of interacting with the plant, through 
formal training, or by working with experienced process workers. The level of 
conscious control is intermediate between that of the knowledge and skill based modes. 
In the skill-based mode, the individual is able to function very effectively by using 
‘pre-programmed’ sequences of behavior which do not require much conscious control. 
It is only occasionally necessary to check on progress at particular points when 
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operating in this mode. Analyzing information to operation is needed in a system, 
including the failure to operate the information. A failure will happen when an 
accumulation of unsafe actions occurs. Failures will occur to one of the subsystem in 
mal function. 
 
6.4 Extent Condition of Maritime Sector in Japan 
6.4.1 Information Data of Maritime Accidents  
 The average number of accidents per year of vessel at sea in Japan was 67.11 
from 1991-2008. Further analysis on the causes accident by unsafe actions are enough 
known that there is a serious concern about effort to minimize accidents that is occur 
such as human casualties. Data collected by the Marine Accident Inquiry Agency 
(MAIA) have shown that human casualties in maritime accidents around Japan have 
shown an increasing trend over the last ten years (fig. 6.5). 
 
Fig.6.5 Example casualty accidents reported in 1991–2008 
Moreover, the characteristic of maritime accidents since 1998-2008 is as follows: 
The collision is about 68 percent of all maritime accidents that were due to human 
errors such as improper look-out, ignoring COLREGS, signaling failure, inadequate 
supervision, fatigue, improper ship’s speed, inadequate report and taking-over watch, 
improper ship handling, no indication lights and shapes and unconfirmed ship position 
were ten of the highest frequency unsafe actions that occurred in the previous 
eleventh-year period (as shown in table 6.1). 
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Table 6.1 Unsafe actions reported in 1998-2008 
(Remarks: yellow color means remarkable and higher number of causes) 
Causes of collision
Unsafe action 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Improper management for ship operation X1 5 8 3 2 5 4 4 8 1 14 12 66
Poor repair conditions  of ship structure X2 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 1 5 3 15
Poor preparation for sea X3 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 3 0 0 0 9
Improper hydrographic survey before
sailing
X4 1 4 5 3 4 5 3 1 6 3 4 39
Inadequate passage planning X5 3 2 6 6 11 4 7 5 8 5 10 67
Improper ship handling X6 21 24 22 15 21 21 11 14 18 21 11 199
Unconfirmed ship's position X7 13 10 17 17 8 9 11 9 16 9 8 127
Improper look-out X8 441 415 444 457 504 502 417 398 360 358 389 4685
Fatique X9 28 31 34 36 38 40 26 36 32 30 39 370
Insufficient maintenance  and wrong
handling of  steering systems and nautical
instruments
X10 2 1 2 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 5 14
Poor attention to  meteorological and
oceanographical
X11 5 9 7 6 10 4 0 8 2 6 5 62
Improper anchoring and mooring X12 2 3 2 3 1 3 3 1 2 6 2 28
Inadequate preparation for rough sea X13 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 2 3 1 9
No indication of navigation lights and
shapes
X14 21 30 16 31 21 18 15 13 8 6 10 189
Signalling  failure X15 90 89 100 72 83 86 79 99 66 68 63 895
Improper ship's speed X16 62 47 56 54 5 23 27 42 21 9 5 351
Ignoring  COLREGS X17 178 194 178 148 164 180 142 150 119 115 115 1683
Main engine failure X18 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 10
Auxiliary engine failure X19 3 2 5 1 3 2 1 2 1 2 0 22
Poor management of lubricant oil X20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 5
Poor management  of  electrical
equipment
X21 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 6
Improper handling and other task X22 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 7
Improper fishing work X23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Poor management of passenger and cargo
loading
X24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
Inadequate supervision of work on board X25 70 76 68 38 53 45 44 51 43 38 45 571
Inadequate report and   taking over the
watch
X26 37 38 26 28 20 17 20 25 18 20 14 263
Poor  management fire X27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Force majeure X28 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Others X29 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 4 5 6 21
986 985 995 922 952 969 819 875 733 727 753 9716
Year Total of
number causes
Variable
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6.4.2 Identification of Unsafe Actions in Analysis Scenario 
 As is shown in fig.4.1 that human error immediately link when got deviation or 
failure combination between substandard practices of operator and/or substandard 
working condition of operator. It is basic errors and other is violations. 
 In the analyzed data report Japan over the period 1998–2008 it was found that 
from 29 conditions such as unsafe actions or unsafe conditions there were 9,716 cases 
described as collision (single) and collision (other) accident (table 6.1). The table 6.2 
has listed as summary one of root cause maritime accidents (chapter 5) then broken 
down to determine as scenario of root causes of maritime accidents. The substandard 
practices of operators are assessed, particularly decisions made without reference to the 
normal conditions of the system or applicable rules. Decision errors are an activity or 
behavior that proceeds as intended, yet the plan proves inadequate or inappropriate for 
the situation. These unsafe actions are performed by individuals who either did not have 
the appropriate knowledge or simply made a poor choice. Unsafe actions in a given 
scenario are analyzed as follows: 
Table 6.2 Unsafe actions by X1–X29 for collision cases from 1998 to 2008  
Unsafe Action Root cause of condition 
Total 
cases 
Improper management 
for ship operations 
(X1) 
Communication is important during operation. 66 
Poor repair conditions 
of ship structure (X2) 
Less detailed checks and trials of applicable ship 
parts to identify problems.  
15 
Poor preparation for 
sea (X3) 
Knowing the times of the tide and obtaining an 
up-to-date weather forecast (especially expected 
wind conditions). 
9 
Improper 
hydrographic survey 
before sailing (X4) 
The work of a hydrographic survey technician can 
be broken down into several main job functions. 
Within each category, there are a series of various 
tasks that must be performed. 
39 
Inadequate passage 
planning (X5) 
Courses have not been selected to take advantage of 
weather and currents and most efficient routes. 
67 
Improper ship 
handling (X6) 
Ships handling in confined waters, particularly 
narrow waterways, has received a great deal of 
attention. Lack of adequate training and experience 
by officers. 
199 
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Unconfirmed ship 
position (X7) 
The basics of navigation as commonly practiced by 
every sailor are not adhered to. 
127 
Improper look-out 
(X8) 
Every vessel shall maintain a proper lookout by 
sight and hearing at all times. Look-out must be 
dedicated job, i.e. no other-job. Under-manning and 
fatigue undermine this most vital work. 
4685 
Fatigue (X9) 
The combination of wind and waves can cause sea 
sickness, which affects motor skills and the ability 
to think clearly. Generally induced by overwork and 
lack of rest. Regulations require more stringent 
rest/work hours but these are frequently ignored. 
Fatigue robs the person of adequate mental and 
physical abilities. 
370 
Insufficient 
maintenance and 
wrong handling of 
steering systems and 
nautical instruments 
(X10) 
There is a strict PMS (Planned Maintenance 
Systems) on ships and tests and checks should be 
carried out on the Steering gear and Nautical 
equipment. Daily. 
The root cause of not being done is inadequacy in 
the ship’s and Ship owner’s Safety Management 
System. 
14 
Poor attention to 
meteorological and 
oceanographically 
information (X11) 
Poor attention to meteorology and oceanography 
lowers the quality of meteorological forecast and 
warning services that support the safety of life and 
property at sea (SOLAS). Root cause: poorly trained 
ship staff that lack sufficient incentives to improve. 
62 
Improper anchoring 
and mooring (X12) 
Generally, improper anchoring and mooring owing 
to unsafe actions that do not select good anchorage 
and drag the anchor. Incorrect anchoring in tidal 
waters must be minimized to prevent accidents on a 
ship. Inexperienced Master and deck officers. 
28 
Inadequate preparation 
for rough sea (X13) 
It is very important for a seafarer to know what to 
do in rough weather so that mistakes can be avoided 
when quick decisions need to be made; the ship can 
be prepared for rough sea by taking precautions 
such as steering control and machinery control. 
9 
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No indication of 
navigation lights and 
shapes (X14) 
Root cause: lack of leadership and seamanship.  189 
Signaling failure 
(X15) 
Refers to improperly interpreting relevant signals 
from the ship whistle when making maneuvers.  
895 
Improper ship speed 
(X16) 
Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe 
speed to take proper and effective action to avoid 
collision and stop within a distance appropriate to 
the prevailing circumstances and conditions.  
351 
Ignoring COLREGS 
(X17) 
Not obeying Collision Regulation (COLREGs) can 
be put down to misinterpretation, even though the 
rules are quite clear. It also stems from deliberate 
actions not to obey the rules. 
1683 
Main engine failure 
(X18) 
Main engine failure is generally due to a lack of 
cylinder overhauling, which means lapses in the 
routine maintenance program, lack of spare parts, 
and inadequate technical management from ship 
owner. Bad quality fuel also causes big problems. 
10 
Auxiliary engine 
failure (X19) 
Primary engine failure requires troubleshooting the 
marine auxiliary diesel engine. Improper 
maintenance damages the machine or system, which 
affects the operational system that is not running 
and triggers failures such as fire.  
22 
Poor management of 
lubricant oil (X20) 
Proper practices and procedures are needed to 
ensure that standby lubricating oil filters are 
available. Ships generally carry a log-book of all 
lubes carried and used on board. Stowage/usage of 
lubricant oil is important. 
5 
Poor management of 
electrical equipment 
(X21) 
A ship steering systems are commonly 
electrohydraulic; the “electric” parts require 
continual checking, testing, and maintenance as all 
electrical systems on the ship do. Ship has an ETO – 
Electro-technical Officer (previously an Electrician) 
on board. With the correct parts a good ETO can 
manage all but – within the PMS again. 
6 
Improper handling and Proper handling and other tasks are largely a matter 7 
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other tasks (X22)  of common sense and necessary for the care and 
protection of objects. Seafarers need to know the 
workplace and be trained in the proper use and 
limitations of the equipment they operate. 
Improper fishing work 
(X23) 
Practical understanding of the basic types of small 
fishing vessels, including common terminology, is 
required. A fishing vessel encumbered by her nets or 
trawl cannot keep out of the way of other vessels; 
Rule 26 directs all other vessels to keep out of the 
way of fishing vessels.  
0 
Poor management of 
passenger and cargo 
loading (X24) 
Root Causes: incorrect declaration of weights, 
contents and MSDS (Marine Safety Data Sheets) of 
all types of cargo, not just containers.  
Passengers? – Lack of tuition and practice drills of 
SOLAS lessons on personal safety. Recognizing 
that actions taken when containers are stuffed may 
have direct implications on the stability and safety 
of ships.  
2 
Inadequate 
supervision of work 
onboard (X25) 
Close supervision by qualified experts is of critical 
importance, starting from a vessel’s inception on the 
drawing board through its sea trials to final delivery 
and continued monitoring during sailing. 
571 
Inadequate reporting 
and taking over the 
watch (X26) 
The officer of the watch should not hand the watch 
over to the relieving officer if he has a good reason 
not to do so. Root cause: Master must ensure his 
OOW’s (Officer of the Watch) are competent to 
stand a watch and to hand over the watch. Root 
cause: Master is not doing his/her job. 
263 
Poor fire management 
(X27) 
Each scenario is influenced by various factors; not 
least the nature of the fire and what is actually 
burning. In the event of an engine room fire, where 
the fire is completely flooded with CO2, the ship 
immediately becomes a “dead ship.” All seafarers, 
from Captain down to galley-boy, undergo strict 
Fire Prevention and Fire Fighting training. Practice 
drills are held weekly. Poor fire management can 
only come from the ship’s Safety Officer – and from 
0 
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the Captain. 
Force majeure (X28) 
Force majeure is sometimes called other forces and 
external forces; and, unforeseeable circumstances. 
In contrast to unpredictable situations, 
nonperformance is caused by usual and natural 
events. (Often termed Act of God). Root cause? – 
Mother Nature. 
1 
Others (X29) 
 
21 
 
6.5 Evaluation Response 
6.5.1 Response of Unsafe Actions in Taxonomy Error 
 Any accident that occurs is a union of several events where unsafe actions were 
taken. An unsafe action is an erroneous decision or action made by a human. Data on 
unsafe actions were previously recorded by MAIA (table 6.2), then developed the data 
were analyzed to determine the possible root causes of the unsafe actions in PIN Safe 
model. The author is took a variety of sources and determined as one of root cause to 
overcome the limited data. 
The next step is understood the root cause of unsafe actions in each scenario; the 
taxonomy error (fig.6.4) presented by the UK P&I Club was implemented as a sample 
set (see eq. 6.4) of event probabilities.  
 By theory of probability, the conditions of each human factor that shapes the 
performance of a seafarer can be implemented as follows: 
  S = {taxonomy error }     (6.6) 
where S is the sample universe of human error: 
  S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13}   (6.7)  
where 1–13 are codes for the taxonomy error (see figure 6.4) in equation (6.7). 
  N(S) = 13; N is the number of members in a sample   (6.8) 
  Not influenced: P{S} = 0/13      (6.9) 
  Influenced: P{S} = 1/13      (6.10) 
The taxonomy error is developed by applying the combined analysis of root cause of 
unsafe actions for every incident that has caused maritime accidents. According to the 
MAIA, one of the most common causes of maritime accidents over the last eleven years 
is collisions. The analysis is as follows: 
If X1 and X2 are two sets in universe S, then the union of X1 and X2 is a new set whose 
membership consists of members of A and B (see eq.6.5): 
   X1 ∪ X2 = {𝑥 𝜖 𝑆 | 𝑥 𝜖 𝑋1 𝑜𝑟 𝑥 𝜖 𝑋2}      (6.11) 
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Venn Diagram 
 
 
        
    Fig.6.6 Venn diagram of compound sets in unsafe actions 
 For every event, an unsafe actions occurred; the compound set in equations 6.5 
shows the chances of collision accidents on the basis of the probabilities of unsafe 
actions such as X1–X29 in the taxonomy error (equations (6.4)–(6.11)) in Rivai, et al. 
[79] as listed in table 6.3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P(X1) P(X2) 
P(X1) ∩ P(X2) 
S  
P(X1) ∪ P(X2) 
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Table 6.3 Counting unsafe actions in taxonomy error 
 
P(Xi)=
n(x)/13;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 i=1,2,…,29
Improper management of ship
operations (X1)
x x x x x x x x x 9 9/13 0.69
Improper hydrographic survey
before sailing (X4)
x x x x x x x x x 9 9/13 0.69
Poor attention to
meteorological and
oceanographical information
(X11)
x x x x x x x x x 9 9/13 0.69
No indication of navigation
lights and shapes (X14)
x x x x x x x x x 9 9/13 0.69
Main engine failure (X18) x x x x x x x x x 9 9/13 0.69
Improper handling and other
tasks (X22)
x x x x x x x x x 9 9/13 0.69
Inadequate passage planning
(X5)
x x x x x x x 7 7/13 0.54
Unconfimed  ship's position
(X7)
x x x x x x x 7 7/13 0.54
Improper anchoring and
mooring (X12)
x x x x x x x 7 7/13 0.54
Improper ship speed  (X16) x x x x x x x 7 7/13 0.54
Poor management  of
electrical equipment (X21)
x x x x x x x 7 7/13 0.54
Improper fishing work (X23) x x x x x x x 7 7/13 0.54
Inadequate reporting and
taking over the  watch (X26)
x x x x x x x 7 7/13 0.54
Poor repair condition  of ship
construction (X2)
x x x x x x x x 8 8/13 0.62
Poor preparation for sea (X3) x x x x x x x x 8 8/13 0.62
Inadequate preparation for
rough seas (X13)
x X x x x x x x 8 8/13 0.62
Signaling  failure (X15) x x x x x x x x 8 8/13 0.62
Auxiliary engine failure (X19) x x x x x x x x 8 8/13 0.62
Insufficient maintenance  and
wrong handling of  steering
systems and nautical
instruments (X10)
x x x x x x 6 6/13 0.46
Poor management of passenger
and cargo loading (X24)
x x x x x x 6 6/13 0.46
Inadequate supervision of
work onboard (X25)
x x x x x x 6 6/13 0.46
Fatigue (X9) x x x x x x x x x x x x 12 12/13 0.92
Ignoring COLREGS  (X17) x x x x x x x x x x x x 12 12/13 0.92
Poor management of lubricant
oil (X20)
x x x x 4 4/13 0.31
Poor fire management  (X27) x x x x 4 4/13 0.31
Improper ship handling (X6) x x x x x x x x x x x 11 11/13 0.85
Improper look-out (X8) x x x x x x x x x x 10 10/13 0.77
Force majeure (X28) x x 2 2/13 0.15
Others (X29) x x x x x x x x x x x x x 13 1 1.00
No
pattern
(P(X1∩X2∩X3∩X4∩X5∩
X6∩X7∩X8∩X9∩X10∩
X11∩X12∩X13∩X14∩
X15∩X16∩X17∩X18∩
X19∩X20∩X21∩X22∩
X23∩X24∩X25∩X26∩
X27∩X28∩X29) )
x
Unsafe action
Taxonomy Error
n (x)
P(Xi)
=n(Xi)/13;
i=1,2,…,29
Code Pattern
x 2
F
A
B
C
D
E
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Remarks:      = influenced one error;  
1= control failure; 2 = omission or repetition; 3 = reversal; 4 = wrong action; 5 = wrong 
object; 6 = too fast; 7 = too slow; 8 = too early; 9 = too little; 10 = too much; 11 =wrong 
input; 12 = miss-calibration; 13 = unclear. 
 
6.5.2 Response Unsafe Actions in 4M Factors  
 Responding to an event then looking at the root cause of the problem is one 
comprehensive solution in minimization of unsafe actions leading to maritime accident. 
In SRM (Safety Response Model), that root cause of problem is viewed from 4 M (Man, 
Machine, Media and Management) Factor which has been described in chapter 2 and 
more be explained within collision accidents in below: 
 Table 6.1 shows that there are 10 (tenth) unsafe actions are a major cause of 
maritime accidents due to collision. 
 In mathematics, an element, or member, of a set is any one of the distinct 
objects that make up that set Schechter [80]. The relation "is an element of", also called 
set membership, is denoted by the signature∈. Writing is  
           X ∈ A                                 (6.12)   
means that "X is an element of A". Equivalent expressions are "X is a member of A.   
In this research, the elements covered are four categories of maritime transport system 
for the safety known as Man, Machine, Media, and Management.   
    Xi ∈{Man or Machine or Media or Management}      (6.13) 
 The number of elements in a particular set is a property known as cardinality; 
informally this is the size of a set. In the above the cardinality of the set for all four 
elements man, machine, media and management is determined from the total numbers 
of each cause and perspective of the causes of induction using 4M factors.  
Table 6.4 illustrates that the next stage has been done by reconstructing the relationships 
from the total number of collision in the maritime transport systems in relation between 
the root causes of every unsafe action with relation of 4 M Factor, and there is a more 
detailed explanation of this in section 6.5. 2 
In condition: 
Tenth (X6,X7,X8,X9,X14,X15,X16,X17,X25,X26) are variable causes of collision as 
independent and higher number of causes.  
Four factors are (Man (Y1), Machine (Y2), Media (Y3), Management (Y4)) which are 
variables in maritime transport system wherein dependency is determined, by Rivai, et 
al. [81]. 
 
 
x 
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Table 6.4 The relationship of 4M Factors with unsafe actions in variable X1-X29 
 
   (Remarks: Bold fonts means remarkable and higher number of causes) 
  (     Not having relationships between causes of collision and one of 4M Factors)  
  (     Having relationships between causes of collisions and one of 4M Factors) 
 
 Fig. 6.7 describes the “relationship causes” of maritime accidents, such as 
collision in the maritime transport systems. To complete this analysis graphically, the 
relationships between the causes of collision in the maritime transport system were 
reached by inserting the resultant values from equation (6.12), (6.13) in the table 6.4. 
 
 
 
Improper management of ship
operation
X1 66 Signaling  failure X15 895
Poor repair condition of ship
construction
X2 15 Improper ship's speed X16 351
Poor preparation for sea X3 9 Ignoring  COLREG X17 1683
Improper hydrographic survey
before sailing
X4 39 Main engine failure X18 10
Inadequate passage planning X5 67 Auxiliary engine failure X19 22
Improper ship handling X6 199
Poor management of lubricant
oil
X20 5
Unconfirmed ship's position X7 127
Poor management  of  electrical
equipment
X21 6
Improper look-out X8 4685
Improper handling and other
tasks
X22 7
Fatique X9 370 Improper fishing work X23 0
Insuffient maintenance  and
wrong handling of steering
systems and nautical
X10 14
Poor management of passenger
and cargo loading
X24 2
Poor attention to meteorology
and oceanography
X11 62
Inadequate supervision of
work onboard
X25 571
Improper anchoring and
mooring
X12 28  Taking over watch X26 263
Inadequate preparation for
rough seas
X13 9 Poor fire management X27 0
Force majeure X28 1
Others X29 21
No indication of navigation
lights and shapes
Total
number
of causes
Relation of maritime transport system
Man
(Y1)
Machine
(Y2)
Media
( Y3)
Management
(Y4)
Related unsafe action Related unsafe action
Total
number
of causes
Relation of maritime transport system
Man
(Y1)
Machine
(Y2)
Media
(Y3)
Management
(Y4)
Variable
causes of
collision
Variable
causes of
collision
X14 189
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Fig.6.7 Relationships of unsafe actions of collision in 4M Factor 
Fig. 6.7 illustrates the highest influences of the relationships as causes of collision in the 
maritime transport system. All together the following results can be drawn: 
(1) Relationship between man, media and management influenced by variable X8 
(improper look-out), and X9 (fatigue). 
(2) Relationship between man, media and management influenced by variable X16 
(improper ship’s speed), X17 (ignoring COLREG). 
(3) Relationship between man, machine, management influenced by variable X14 (no 
indication of navigation light and shapes) and X15 (signaling failure). 
(4) Relationship management influenced by variable X25(inadequate supervision), and 
X26 (taking over watch). 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONSIDERATION AND CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Result  
 The objective of this dissertation is to identify the human elements involved 
in maritime accidents and the countermeasures for reducing the impacts of the human 
elements involved. For this purpose the following tasks have already been completed: 
 Studying the background literature, documents and reports relating to the human 
elements in maritime casualties’ accidents at sea. Preparing information and 
materials needed for the research work.  
 Working out the research plan and determining the methods and approaches used 
in this research by the qualitative method. 
 Establishing a classification for classifying and storing the human elements 
involved in the maritime accidents.  
The risk ranking is determined by combining frequency ranking and consequence 
ranking and then implementing 3A behavior (Appendix-D) as one way of 
overcoming the decrease of quality performance of seafarers. By viewing some 
aspects of the data that has been researched, there can be obtained as follows: 
1. Minor-Moderate-Serious-Disastrous such as improper management for ship 
operation (X1), improper fishing work (X23), poor management of passenger 
and cargo loading (X24).  
2. Minor-Moderate-Serious such as poor repair condition of ship structure (X2), 
poor preparation for sea (X3), poor course selection and course-keeping (X5), 
improper ship handling (X6), improper ship speed (X16), poor management of 
electrical equipment (X21), inadequate reporting and taking over the watch 
(X26), force majeure (X28). 
3. Moderate-Serious such as improper hydrographic data checking before sailing 
(X4), unconfirmed ship positions (X7), improper look-out (X8), fatigue (X9), 
insufficient maintenance and wrong handling of steering systems and nautical 
instruments (X10), poor attention to meteorology and oceanography, improper 
anchoring and mooring (X12), inadequate preparation for rough sea (X13), 
not obeying COLREGS (X17), main engine failure (X18), auxiliary engine 
failure (X19), poor management of lubricant oil (X20) and inadequate 
supervision of work on board (X25). 
4. Serious, such as no indication of navigation light and shapes (X14), poor 
management of safety and fire (X27). 
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 Identifying effective and practical counter measures for reducing the human elements’  
involvement by studying the patterns that have the same value of one kind of 
taxonomy error models that have been developed in order to get the performance 
shaping factors. The patterns are as follows: 
5. Pattern A had a weight of 9/13 and contained unsafe actions such as improper 
management (X1), improper hydrographic data before sailing (X4), poor 
attention paid to meteorological and oceanographical information (X11), no 
indication of navigation lights and shapes (X14), improper handling and other 
tasks (X22), and main engine failure (X18). 
6. Pattern B had a weight of 7/13 and contained unsafe actions such as poor course 
selection (X5), unconfirmed ship positions (X7), improper anchoring and 
mooring (X12), improper ship speed (X16), poor management of electrical 
equipment (X21), improper fishing work (X23), and inadequate report and 
taking over the watch (X26). 
7. Pattern C had a weight of 8/13 and contained unsafe actions such as poor 
preparation for sea (X3), inadequate preparation for rough seas (X13), main 
engine failure (X18), and auxiliary engine failure (X19). 
8. Pattern D had a weight of 6/13 and contained unsafe actions such as insufficient 
maintenance and wrong handling of steering systems and nautical instruments 
(Y10), poor management of passenger and cargo loading (X24), and inadequate 
supervision of onboard work (X25). 
9. Pattern E had a weight of 12/13 and contained unsafe actions such as fatigue 
(X9) and not obeying COLREGS (X17). 
10. Pattern F had a weight of 4/13 and contained unsafe actions such as poor 
management of lubricant oil (X20) and poor management of safety and fire 
(X27). 
11. Analysis of the taxonomy error found that the root causes of control failure and 
unclear situations were mostly human error. 
 The methods in use for this dissertation mainly consist of: collecting actual unsafe 
actions data from current written accident reports; establishing a classification of the 
human element for collecting and storing the data picked up from the written reports; 
designing a simple mathematical model for analyzing the data collected from data 
reports. The main findings and achievements are:  
12. For identifying the human elements involved in accidents at sea, in the 
classification for collecting and storing the data relating to the human element 
involvement in maritime accidents, this has been proposed by the qualitative 
model.  
102 
 
13. The method is reasonable to apply. Using this qualitative model, the author 
could find relationship causes of accidents in the term of maritime transport 
system.  
14. Flexible data. Using one variable as independent can find relationships to other 
data. Logic of pattern has been used. Sources are from both printed theories and 
from opinions of experts, as well as root causes from unsafe actions.   
15. Sampling weights by AND/OR within taxonomy error (Appendix-E) in maritime 
system (4M factors) as alternative qualitative model. Using this model, a second 
opinion in the decision-making for management improvement can be done.  
 The written accident report is currently the most useful and available source to 
develop one method for minimizing accidents and improving safety of life at sea by 
PIN Safe model. This model provides more detailed information regarding human 
performance in characteristics of accident which is a value from the unsafe action 
involved. Developing PIN Safe model, because:  
16. PIN Safe model analyzes unsafe actions in the root causes of accidents within 
the human element and thus the basic data for safety assessment can only be 
identified by the application of an accurate and structured method that accounts 
for the cognitive and social processes involved in the management of a system. 
17. The framework for qualitative assessment combines the taxonomy error in the 
set of a system, which is a union of unsafe actions that have occurred. This 
method is one way to recognize patterns of unsafe actions. 
18. PIN Safe as anticipation of engineering controls is anticipated of all human 
factors. Initiating events could lead to process deviations. Measurement 
parameters in all operations by approaching logic of pattern can help to suggest 
for improved motivation of self; and censoring of equipment by ergonomic 
design is useful to help to reach good performance in the working environment 
with probability of exposure and casualty rate. During observation of boating 
accidents, the failure probabilities are distinguished from the corresponding 
exposure. 
19. PIN Safe as the pattern of unsafe action in risk monitoring is realized as critical 
events have consequences, which have potential impact to accidents. Every 
accident that occurs has been interacted within unsafe actions of the seafarer in 
the working environment. Interactions of them will have their own 
characteristics or pattern. Risk is the probability and severity of loss from 
exposure to the hazard. The third key aspect of exposure, which is the number of 
personnel or resources affected by a given event or over time by repeated events, 
is called in controlling taxonomy error within 4M Factors, the comprehensive 
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monitoring information processing database. Those are needed for the role of 
management to evaluate. Combinations of them in analysis can help result in 
minimal exposure on mishap, to improve protective capacities in psychological 
factors based on IMO investigation of human factors. Further aspects that can 
help self-regulation are encouraged where possible as a part effort to help 
develop a safety culture in the industry, because: 
20. Root cause analysis of the taxonomy error found that control failure and unclear 
situations are mostly caused by human errors due to unintended actions, which 
mainly stem from a lack of information or from misinformation. 
21. In the case of mistakes, the mistakes tend to be very resistant to contravening 
evidence. People tend to ignore feedback information that does not support their 
expectations of the situation. This is one reason that it was needed to produce a 
database to qualitatively assess the attributes of unsafe actions to improve safety 
culture. 
22. PIN Safe could be done because the database information management 
organization initial, basic level is unsafe actions when interacting with the other 
systems.  
23. The PIN Safe model is a database management system which needs integration 
and continuity at all levels of the seafarer to gain protection management. This 
information model gives advice to the seafarer for improving shaping factors by 
approaching social culture without judgments. Taking from this information of 
the seafarer is a consideration for specific training to enhance individual 
protection in the safety of life at sea. 
24. The PIN Safe model is encouraged as self-regulation should be done as part of 
the efforts to develop a safety culture in the industry. This encourages every 
worker to take responsibility for areas of safety they can influence, and 
encourages them to own and operate companies that give safety the highest 
priority in their working practices with recognition of taxonomy error of self. 
 
7.2 Consideration 
1. Developing reports  
Currently available accident reports provided valuable information about the cause 
of the accident, the scene and the factors that led to the accident. But most of them 
fail to provide more information in all maritime aspects between man, machine, 
media and management about the underlying human element. 
2. Trial application of codes error 
Trial application of codes error is realized in order to be aware of human weakness 
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and inherent dangers posed by different situations and they may be beneficial as 
guidelines on what to do and the effectiveness when assessed. If necessary, further 
amendments are needed. There are a few things that were developed in this pattern, 
among others: 
a. Machine for technology 
 Counteracting pattern A involves developing appropriate technology for 
human capabilities to mitigate the low visibility and restricted maneuvering in 
bad weather conditions and in narrow waterways in Japan. For identification 
purposes, lights have individual characteristics in terms of color, intensity and 
operation system according to the different perceptions of seafarers. 
b. Relations of all crew  
 Counteracting pattern B involves improving collaboration by operation 
arrangements and maintaining interpersonal communications (mental, 
physical, skill sharing) with other seafarers on the ship. 
 Unsuitable interpersonal relations are a cause that the attention is not drawn to 
tasks, which should be fulfilled, but to other directions. The consequences are 
irritation, over-sensitiveness, feeling of discomfort, stress, dissatisfaction and 
higher incidence of illness and injuries. The influence of psychosomatic 
aspects on the reliability and safety of working performance is equally 
important than the effect of action of physical factors, whether directly as an 
objective source of workload or through a response in the psychical sphere as 
a subjective source of workload. Depending on the quality of these factors of 
work environments, optimal or not optimal, excessive workload will occur or 
the employee is able or not able to cope with this situation, or avoid it. 
c. Management of training in critical situations  
 Counteracting pattern C involves cooperating between management and 
seafarers on special issues such as critical situations at sea; moreover, engine 
conditions should be improved. Critical situations are the decreased reliability 
of the system technology which is important as a consideration. The 
improvements in structural integrity and the reliability of machinery and 
electrical systems by recognizing failures is a good correction. 
 Recognizing in the classification failures from unsafe actions of the systems 
when divided into two types, single and multiple failures are produced, based 
on the impact on all the systems. Failures of unsafe actions are due to the 
impact of critical situations and classified into single and multiple failures 
according to the effect they impact. Usually any unsafe action that leads to a 
single or to multiple failures can be addressed by looking into the culture so 
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long as the human failure can be distinguished from the components of 
mechanism.   
d. Design of ship 
Counteracting pattern D involves mitigating ship design problems such as 
steering, nautical instruments, and control issues for passenger and cargo loading 
without compromising the safety of the ship. The IMO/ILO/UNECE Guidelines 
on the Packing of Cargo Transport Units provides a common global resource for 
information on container stuffing. 
e. Seafarer performance  
Counteracting pattern E involves maintaining the physical and mental 
conditions of the seafarers to create a culture of safety. When the body and 
mind are fatigued, non-compliances can occur, and rules may not be obeyed. 
Team cooperation is needed to minimize rule violations. Seafarers should be 
reminded of the basics of the COLREGS. 
Safe operating procedures are continuously being amended to prohibit specific 
actions that were implicated in some accident, incident or near miss. The 
result is that the scope of allowable action shrinks as the system or technology 
matures. But the range of actions necessary to get the job done under less than 
ideal circumstances need not diminish. This creates the conditions necessary 
for situational violations. That is, non-compliance that is committed simply in 
order to get a particular job done. It means a response to the challenge.  
f. Management of operation in breakdown of equipment and in non-standard 
situations 
Counteracting pattern F involves comprehensive database management 
technology for the maintenance engine so as to aid human decisions. The 
development of monitoring technology for database management will mitigate 
poor human decisions such as neglecting lubricant oil, which contribute to 
engine failure. Poor monitoring of lubricant oil prevents moving components 
from working smoothly; friction would quickly destroy these surfaces and 
cause engine failure which in turn could lead to fire. In terms of operational 
safety it is important to train employees not only in the professional area, i.e. 
to gain knowledge, skills and habits, but also to prepare individuals in the 
psychical area, i.e. to maintain their adequate performance in non-standard 
and stress situations.  
3. Keep continuous casualty investigation  
IMO adopted the code for the investigation of marine casualties and incidents in 
1997. For further addressing the human elements in casualty investigation, IMO 
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amended the code by adding the guidelines for the investigation of human factors 
in marine casualties and incidents into its Appendix (IMO, 1997 November 27, 
2000a). The guidelines offer methods and techniques for the collection and 
analysis of information, which help the investigator to methodically identify 
human factors leading to the accidents. The objective of the guidelines is to alert 
the seafarers to the contributory role of human elements in causing maritime 
accidents.  
4. Effectiveness of actions 
 The reliable effectiveness of actions is to be developed in critical situations, and 
the steps such as developing a safety culture in the working environment should be 
shown to be effective in reducing the impact of the unsafe actions in collisions and 
other accidents. Through taxonomy error based on the self, it is recommended that 
initially all relevant parties of maritime safety should actively try to find ways to 
develop new a safety culture and make it a positive and integral part of all 
personnel activities. 
5. Prescriptive regulation 
Prescriptive regulation plays an important and active role in improving the level of 
safety at sea, but to create more rules to eliminate human error in maritime 
industry is not a good and effective way. Knowing the pattern of deviations from 
unsafe actions, then to provide enhanced training and specific education to make 
trainees aware of human limitations and inherent exposure by different situations 
may be more beneficial. 
6. Providing considerations on future work to reduce the effects of human elements  
The further research which will be performed in order to improve safety culture 
are presented as follows: 
A) In depth analysis of the root causes of any unsafe actions is still needed to be 
improved upon in order to obtain the validity of the method PIN Safe as a model 
of innovative interaction in real implementations for all seafarers. 
B) Design of questionnaires as related to the taxonomy errors, and developed the 
scope of 4M Factors, could be implemented in the finite element method as one 
alternative in a qualitative procedure. 
C)  Monitoring and evaluation of the uses of PIN Safe databases as a consideration 
for all seafarer to encourage self-regulation. 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
 According to the explanations of all chapters, some of the following can be 
concluded: 
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1. Everyone has limitations 
 Limitations are deviations from combinations, like a union, of failures between 
substandard practices by operators and substandard working conditions of operators 
in the term of human errors implemented, such as memory, workload, attitude, 
personality traits, experience, knowledge and training based on IMO 2000. Anyone 
can have limitations in that everyone has different unsafe actions because of the 
influence of various factors that affect the characteristics of unsafe actions. Some 
examples between relations from unsafe actions are, as the author has proposed, as 
aligned by the following relationships – the relationship between man and media 
influenced by variable X8 (improper look-out), and X9 (fatigue); between media and 
management influenced by variable X16 (improper ship’s speed), X17 (not obeying 
COLREG) and X18 (main engine failure); between man and machine influenced by 
variable X14 (no indication of navigation light and shapes) and X15 (signaling 
failure); between management influenced by variable X25 (inadequate supervision), 
and X26 (inadequate report). 
2. Everyone can have different characteristic of unsafe actions 
Everyone has a unique character and each of us requires self-recognition in order 
to accept and overcome the unsafe actions we make. Every one of us needs to 
accept the specific training required to develop our skills in order to obviate our 
unsafe actions. And - everyone needs to maintain the specific education and 
training methodology. The specific education and training should be given based 
on the characteristics of human performance. It could be recognized as a kind of 
“control mapping”, as is created in good management. 
3. Strong management 
 Strong management is required to tackle every characteristic of unsafe actions in 
establishing the evaluation strategies. Evaluation of taxonomy error, as 
implemented in 4M (man, machine, media and management) factors, is a strategy 
to develop the performance shaping factors of seafarers to reach protective 
capacities. 
4. Monitoring and controlling operations in breakdowns  
 Monitoring and controlling of all factors should be done to avoid critical situations 
and to minimize human casualties. In chapter 5, we saw the result that the highest 
cases of human casualty come from unsafe actions such as improper management 
for ship operation, mismanagement of electrical equipment, improper handling and 
other tasks, improper fishing work, poor management involving passengers and 
cargo loading; and others. So, keeping up with specific training in the time allotted 
is vital to halt any unsafe actions. Knowing the kind of control needed in unsafe 
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actions can help to develop a unique approach for improving human performance. 
5. Safety culture in all parties 
The ideology of implementing 3A (Awareness, Action, Attitude) in control 
behavior can be realized. Initiating events of unsafe actions could lead to process 
deviations. Measurement parameters in all operations by approaching logic 
perspective can help to suggest methods for improved motivation of the self, and 
censoring of equipment by ergonomic design is useful to help reach good 
performance in the working environment. 
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APPENDIX-A Data Report from JTSB, Kind of maritime accidents, 1991-2008 
Table A Data Report from JTSB, Kind of maritime accidents, 1991-2008 
Year 
Collision 
(Others) 
Collision 
(Single) 
Stranding/ 
Grounding 
Sinking Capsizing Distress Fire Explosion 
Engine 
Failure 
Missing 
Equipment 
Damage 
1991 1166 34 272 6 31 42 28 4 143 0 0 
1992 856 65 225 17 17 32 24 7 148 0 1 
1993 710 46 204 46 15 5 30 6 223 0 0 
1994 861 70 191 18 41 50 25 4 213 0 0 
1995 912 44 248 9 27 28 28 1 230 0 0 
1996 766 84 201 15 27 39 37 13 211 0 0 
1997 879 64 203 7 33 34 25 0 138 0 0 
1998 922 64 206 17 21 14 25 2 123 0 0 
1999 919 66 187 8 26 31 20 1 139 0 0 
2000 911 84 167 10 31 25 32 3 130 0 0 
2001 836 86 189 3 29 26 25 1 117 0 4 
2002 871 81 212 7 35 35 27 3 91 0 2 
2003 898 71 211 2 39 11 30 0 114 0 0 
2004 748 71 176 11 25 9 19 0 108 0 0 
2005 803 72 160 9 34 18 21 3 111 0 1 
2006 647 86 205 12 39 14 20 2 81 1 0 
2007 646 81 196 12 33 12 24 6 100 1 0 
2008 673 80 197 9 51 10 13 2 111 0 4 
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Year 
Facilities 
damage 
Casualty 
Safety 
inhibitor 
Operation 
inhibitor 
Flooding  
 
1991 11 59 0 17 0 
 
1992 16 50 2 10 0 
 
1993 32 57 0 5 0 
 
1994 22 45 1 13 0 
 
1995 26 61 0 31 0 
 
1996 31 70 0 22 0 
 
1997 19 74 0 28 0 
 
1998 14 46 1 8 0 
 
1999 23 69 0 8 0 
 
2000 30 33 1 12 0 
 
2001 28 63 0 21 0 
 
2002 20 65 0 11 0 
 
2003 14 79 1 19 12 
 
2004 14 62 1 18 14 
 
2005 24 84 1 19 27 
 
2006 23 95 0 19 11 
 
2007 23 95 0 19 11 
 
2008 32 101 0 23 23 
 
Total 434 1309 8 326 98 27,511 
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APPENDIX-B Personal Identification Safe in Logic of Patterns  
 
 
Fig. B Flowchart strategy of Personal Identification (PIN) Safe model in  
working environment 
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APPENDIX-C Personal Identification Safe in Probability Weight 
 
 
Fig. C Strategy of Personal Identification (PIN) Safe model as features of safety 
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APPENDIX-D Consequences in Risk and PIN Safe Evaluations 
 Table D.1 Consequences level minor-moderate-serious-disaster  
Consequences 
Level 
Unsafe actions/conditions 
 PIN Safe 
Evaluations 
Minor-Moderate-
Serious-Disaster 
Improper management for ship operation (X1)  Awareness 
Improper handling and other task(X22)  Awareness 
Improper fishing work (X23) 
Attitude and 
action 
Poor management of passenger and cargo 
loading(X24)  
Attitude and 
action 
Others (X29) Monitoring  
 
Table D.2 Consequences level minor-moderate-serious  
Consequences 
Level 
Unsafe actions/conditions 
  PIN Safe 
Evaluations  
Minor-Moderate-
Serious 
Poor repair condition on ship structure(X2)  Monitoring 
Poor preparation for sea(X3)  Monitoring 
Inadequate passage planning for ship's (X5)  Action 
Improper ship handling(X6)  Controlling 
Improper ship's speed (X16)  
Controlling 
and 
monitoring  
Poor management of electrical equipment (X21)  Monitoring 
Inadequate supervision of working on board (X25)  
Controlling/ 
monitoring 
Inadequate report and taking over watch on board 
(X26)  
Controlling  
Force majeure (X28)  
Controlling/ 
monitoring 
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Table D.3 Consequences level moderate-serious  
Consequences 
Level 
Unsafe actions/conditions 
PIN Safe 
Evaluations 
Moderate-Serious 
Improper hydrographic survey (X4)  Monitoring 
Unconfirmed ship position (X7) Controlling  
Improper look-out (X8)  Monitoring 
Fatigue (X9)  Monitoring 
Insufficient maintenance and wrong handling 
of steering systems and nautical 
instruments(X10)  
Monitoring is 
needed awareness  
Poor attention to meteorological and 
oceanographically (X11) 
Monitoring, 
controlling  
Improper anchoring and mooring (X12) Monitoring 
Inadequate preparation for rough at sea (X13)  
Monitoring,  
controlling  
Signaling failure (X15)  
Monitoring is 
needed awareness  
Ignoring COLREGS (X17) Action  
Main engine failure (X18)  Controlling 
Auxiliary engine failure (X19) Controlling 
Poor management of lubricant oil (X20) Monitoring 
 
Table D.4 Consequences level serious  
Consequences 
Level 
Unsafe actions/conditions 
PIN Safe 
Evaluations 
Serious 
No indication of navigation lights and shapes 
(X14)  
Monitoring 
Poor management fire (X27) Attitude 
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APPENDIX-E Sampling Weights of Each Pattern 
Table E.1 Sampling weights of pattern A 
 
    = influenced one error. 
 
1= control failure; 2 = omission or repetition; 3 = reversal; 4 = wrong action; 5 = wrong 
object; 6 = too fast; 7 = too slow; 8 = too early; 9 = too little; 10 = too much; 11 = 
wrong input; 12 = miss-calibration; 13 = unclear. 
 
 
 
 
 
P(Xi)=
n(x)/13;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 i=1,2,…,29
Improper
management of
ship operations
(X1)
x x x x x x x x x 9 9/13=0.69
Improper
hydrographic
survey before
sailing (X4)
x x x x x x x x x 9 9/13=0.69
Poor attention
to
meteorological
and
oceanographical
information
(X11)
x x x x x x x x x 9 9/13=0.69
No indication of
navigation lights
and shapes
(X14)
x x x x x x x x x 9 9/13=0.69
Main engine
failure (X18)
x x x x x x x x x 9 9/13=0.69
Improper
handling and
other tasks
(X22)
x x x x x x x x x 9 9/13=0.69
A
Unsafe action
Taxonomy Error
n (x) PatternCode
x 
  
122 
 
Table E.2 Sampling weights of pattern B 
 
Table E.3 Sampling weights of pattern C 
 
    = influenced one error. 
 
1= control failure; 2 = omission or repetition; 3 = reversal; 4 = wrong action; 5 = wrong 
object; 6 = too fast; 7 = too slow; 8 = too early; 9 = too little; 10 = too much; 11 = 
wrong input; 12 = miss-calibration; 13 = unclear. 
P(Xi)=
n(x)/13;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 i=1,2,…,29
Inadequate
passage planning
(X5)
x x x x x x x 7 7/13=0.54
Unconfimed
ship's position
(X7)
x x x x x x x 7 7/13=0.54
Improper
anchoring and
mooring (X12)
x x x x x x x 7 7/13=0.54
Improper ship
speed  (X16)
x x x x x x x 7 7/13=0.54
Poor management
of  electrical
equipment (X21)
x x x x x x x 7 7/13=0.54
Improper fishing
work (X23)
x x x x x x x 7 7/13=0.54
Inadequate
reporting and
taking over the
watch (X26)
x x x x x x x 7 7/13=0.54
Code
B
Unsafe action
Taxonomy Error
n (x) Pattern
P(Xi)=
n(x)/13;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 i=1,2,…,29
Poor repair
condition  of ship
construction
(X2)
x x x x x x x x 8 8/13=0.62
Poor preparation
for sea (X3)
x x x x x x x x 8 8/13=0.62
Inadequate
preparation for
rough seas (X13)
x x x x x x x x 8 8/13=0.62
Signaling  failure
(X15)
x x x x x x x x 8 8/13=0.62
Auxiliary engine
failure (X19)
x x x x x x x x 8 8/13=0.62
Code
C
Unsafe action
Taxonomy Error
n (x) Pattern
x 
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P(Xi)=
n(x)/13;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 i=1,2,…,29
Insufficient
maintenance  and
wrong handling of
steering systems and
nautical instruments
(X10)
x x x x x x 6 6/13=0.46
Poor management of
passenger and cargo
loading (X24)
x x x x x x 6 6/13=0.46
Inadequate
supervision of work
onboard (X25)
x x x x x x 6 6/13=0.46
D
Unsafe action
Taxonomy Error
n (x) Pattern
Code
Table E.4 Sampling weights of pattern D 
 
Table E.5 Sampling weights of pattern E 
 
 
Table E.6 Sampling weights of pattern F 
 
    = influenced one error. 
 
1= control failure; 2 = omission or repetition; 3 = reversal; 4 = wrong action; 5 = wrong 
object; 6 = too fast; 7 = too slow; 8 = too early; 9 = too little; 10 = too much; 11 = 
wrong input; 12 = miss-calibration; 13 = unclear. 
 
P(Xi)=
n(Xi)/13;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 i=1,2,…,29
Fatigue
(X9)
x x x x x x x x x x x x 12 12/13=0.92
Ignoring
COLREGS
(X17)
x x x x x x x x x x x x 12 12/13=0.92
Code
E
Unsafe
action
Taxonomy Error
n (X) Pattern
P(Xi)=
n(x)/13;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 i=1,2,…,29
Poor management of
lubricant oil (X20)
x x x x 4 4/3=0.31
Poor fire management
(X27)
x x x x 4 4/3=0.31
Code
F
Unsafe action
Taxonomy Error
n (x) Pattern
x 
